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CHAPTER 10 
Constitutional Law 
JOSEPH D. CRONIN* 
§10.1. Modification of constitutional standards in libel law. In 
May of the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court decided Stone v. 
Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 1 a case involving the then quite unsettled 
impact of the First Amendment on libel law. Less than two months 
later, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 2 clarified some of the ambiguities of earlier opinions in this area. 
This section will assess some of the problems presented by Stone in 
light of the later Gertz decision. 
In Stone the plaintiff's son had been prosecuted for certain narcotics 
offenses. Through a mix-up, defendant newspaper reported that 
plaintiff, rather than his son, was the owner of the "harmful drug."3 
The trial judge charged the jury that plaintiff could recover simply by 
showing publication of a defamatory falsehood. The jury returned a 
verdict for the plaintiff. 4 
On appeal, the principal issue before the Supreme Judicial Court 
was that of what the applicable constitutional standards are in cases 
involving libel by the news media. In 1964 in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,5 the United States Supreme Court had established that the 
basis of recovery in a libel suit instituted by a public official6 is a show-
ing of knowing or reckless falsity. 7 In 1971, in Rosenbloom v. Met-
*JosEPH D. CRONIN is an Associate Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School. 
§10.1. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 693,311 N.E.2d 52. 
2 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a discussion of Gertz with emphasis on its tort and dam· 
ages aspects, see §§ 6.9-.1 0 supra. 
3 Justice Hennessey, writing for the majority, briefly noted that the published state-
ment was defamatory even though technically a crime was not alleged in the article, 
1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 695-96, 311 N.E.2d at 55, and that the common law privilege to 
report judicial proceedings was inapplicable because the requirement of accuracy in all 
material matters was not satisfied. Id. at 696, 311 N.E.2d at 55. 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 693, 311 N.E.2d at 53. 
5 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
6 In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 .U.S. 130 (1967), this standard was extended 
to suits brought by a public figure. 
7 376 U.S. at 282-83. The New York Times standard has been interpreted to require 
only "knowing or _reckless ~alsity" and not pe_rsona! spite or ill. will. _Therefore, the 
phrase "actual mahce" used m New York Tzmes Itself IS perhaps m1sleadmg. See Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
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romedia, Inc., 8 the Court appeared to extend the "knowing or reckless 
falsity" standard to cases in which, although the plaintiff is a private 
individual, the matters reported are of public or general interest. 9 
The state of the law was unclear, however, since no opinion in 
Rosenbloom commanded the assent of more than three justices, Justice 
Douglas did not participate, and two changes in the membership of 
the Court had occurred since the date of decision. 
Despite this lack of clarity, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed and 
remanded for a new trial the lower court judgments in Stone on the 
basis of the standard announced in Rosenbloom. 10 Moreover, the Court 
noted that the evidence presented at the first trial indicated that a 
jury could properly find satisfaction of the "knowing or reckless fal-
sity" standard. 11 On the question of damages, the Court reaffirmed 
that under the law of the Commonwealth only compensatory damages 
may be recovered in a defamation action. 12 The risk to First Amend-
ment values posed by the possibility that a jury would impose punitive 
damages under the guise of compensatory damages could, in the 
Court's view, be obviated by the trial court's power to reduce verdicts 
regarded as excessive. 13 
Less than two months after the decision in Stone, the Supreme 
Court decided Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 14 The Court held that a pub-
lisher of a defamatory falsehood about a private individual who is 
neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim the protec-
tion of the "knowing or reckless falsity" standard of the New York 
Times line of cases. 15 If the "defamatory statement makes substantial 
danger to reputation apparent,"16 that is, if the content of the state-
ment warns "a reasonably prudent editor of its defamatory 
potential,"17 then the states may select, short of liability without fault, 
8 403 u.s. 29 (1971). 
9 ld. at 43. 
10 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 697-98,311 N.E.2d at 56. 
11 The Court based its conclusion on the fact that the editor acknowledged being 
"surprised" by the story; that the editor knew the plaintiff personally and knew him to 
be an "excellent citizen;" and that the editor knew that the writer of the story had min-
imal training and experience. I d. at 701, 311 N.E.2d at 58. 
12 Id. at 702-04, 311 N.E.2d at 58-59. 
13 Id. Justice Quirico, with whom Chief Justice Tauro joined, dissented because the 
trial court had not determined that the subject of the action had been an event of pub-
lic or general concern and because, even if the event were of general concern, the 
plaintiff himself had not been involved in it. Id. at 705-11, 311 N.E.2d at 59-63. 
14 418 u.s. 323 (1974). 
15 Id. at 347. This approach involves a retreat from the stance adopted in Rosenbloom. 
In another respect, however, it goes beyond Rosenbloom. Under Gertz, the states are for-
bidden to impose liability without fault even in a case involving a private person's ac-
tivities that are not of public interest. 418 U.S. at 347. This question had been reserved 
in Rosenbloom. 403 U.S. at 44 n.l2, 48-49 n.l7. 
16 418 U.S. at 348. 
17 Id. 
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whatever standard of liability they think appropriate.18 
On the issue of damages, the Court stated that only proven actual 
injury is compensable. 19 Unless the "knowing or reckless falsity" stan-
dard is satisfied, neither presumed nor punitive damages will be 
permitted.20 "Actual injury" was not defined but will be given a liberal 
interpretation so as to include not only out-of-pocket loss but also per-
sonal humiliation and mental suffering. 21 
There were four dissenting opinions, reflecting the diversity of 
opinion that has prevailed on the Court in this area. These minority 
views ranged from Justice Douglas' long espoused view that the First 
Amendment totally invalidates state libellaws22 to Justice White's posi-
tion that the First Amendment in no way restricts the power of states 
to redress libelous publications about private individuals who are not 
involved in public matters.23 More notable was Justice Blackmun's 
concurrence, in which he reaffirmed his belief that Rosenbloom had 
been a logical extension of earlier cases. 24 Nevertheless, Justice 
Blackmun provided a fifth vote for Justice Powell's majority opinion 
chiefly because of a belief that a majority of the Court should speak 
with a more or less definitive voice on this subject. 25 
The Gertz decision significantly alters the constitutional aspects of 
libel law. A majority of the Court now agrees that even if the content 
of a publication is a matter of general or public interest, a private in-
dividual does not bear the burden of proving that a defamatory 
statement was published with a knowing or reckless disregard of the 
truth. This rejection of Rosenbloom's plurality analysis correlatively 
18 Id. at 347. 
19 Id. at 349. 
2o Id. 
21 Id. at 350. 
22 Id. at 356 (Douglas, J ., dissenting). 
23 I d. at 399 (White, J ., dissenting). 
24 Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J ., concurring). 
25 Id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring). While it may seem peculiar that a Justice 
would vote contrary to his beliefs in order to provide clearer precedent, grateful recog-
nition should be accorded to Justice Blackmun for his efforts. The area is one where 
able persons of good will obviously disagree and no moral imperatives that do not 
admit of compromise appear to be at stake. There have been other occasions when 
members of the Court have submerged their views in the interest of allowing the Court 
to give a clear answer to a problem and other occasions when they did not but perhaps 
should have. Compare Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945) (concurring 
opinion), where if Justice Rutledge had voted his real views the case could not have 
been decided at all, with both Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492 (concur-
ring opinion), where Justice Harlan missed a chance to clarify the impact of a major 
case, and Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 596 (1974) (concurring opinion) where Jus-
tice Powell, with the Court otherwise divided 4-4 in regard to the "automobile excep-
tion" to the search warrant requirement, discussed only his belief that the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule generally should not apply to collateral attack on convic-
tions. 
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casts doubt upon the precedential value of the Stone decision. In this 
regard, it must be emphasized that Gertz does not mandate the appli-
cation of any particular standard of liability in a libel action instituted 
by a private individual; rather, "the States may define for themselves 
the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of 
defamatory falsehood .... "26 It would seem, however, that the Su-
preme Judicial Court will retreat from the actual malice test, i.e., 
knowing or reckless disregard of the truth, which has been applied in 
the Commonwealth since the Rosenbloom decision. 27 Inasmuch as this 
test is no longer constitutionally required, the Massachusetts courts 
are free to provide a greater degree of protection from the damaging 
effects of defamatory statements. Adherence to a standard that is less 
demanding than the Rosenbloom/Stone test would merely be, as Justice 
Powell stated for the majority in Gertz, "recognition of the strong and 
legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for injury 
to reputation."28 
Another aspect of the Stone decision is not entirely consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent in the area of libel law. In New York Times, 
the Court described the burden of proof allocated to the plaintiff in 
terms of "convincing clarity,"29 and in Rosenbloom as "clear and con-
vincing proof."30 Surprisingly, however, in the face of this language, 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Stone took the position that these 
phrases refer not to the quantum of evidence required but only to the 
fact that recklessness must be proved: 
We think it advisable to comment that, in our view, these expres-
sions are not intended to vary the usual measure of the plaintiff's 
burden of proof. Proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence is 
still the requirement. The "convincing clarity" and "clear and con-
vincing" concepts are not a necessary or appropriate part of the 
instructions to the jury in a case such as the instant one. It seems 
evident that these phrases were used by the Supreme Court with 
reference to the necessity for proof of at least recklessness, and 
not mere negligence, in publication. As such they relate only to 
the judge's consideration of the issues raised by a motion for a di-
rected verdict. 31 
With all respect, it is hard to support this interpretation. First, an 
unnatural reading of language is necessary in order to interpret 
phrases such as "clear and convincing evidence" as referring to what 
is to be proved rather than to the quantum of evidence. Secondly, 
26 418 U.S. at 347. 
27 See 197 4 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 697-98, 311 N .E.2d at 56. 
28 418 U.S. at 348-49. 
29 376 U.S. at 285-86. 
30 403 U.S. at 52. 
31 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 702, 311 N.E.2d at 58. 
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such an interpretation does not in fact seem to have been adopted in 
other cases. 32 
On the other hand, regardless of the original meaning of the "clear 
and convincing" standard, it is possible that the Supreme Court, if 
squarely faced with the question, would not require any specially se-
vere standard of proof. In Lego v. Twomey,33 the Court held that the 
voluntariness of a confession may be determined by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 34 The Court indicated that the preponderance test 
would also be appropriate in challenging the admissibility of evidence 
on other constitutional grounds. 35 Problems of the type arising un-
der the Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona36 were specifically 
mentioned37 even though in Miranda itself the Court had said that the 
government would have a "heavy burden" to demonstrate waiver. 38 It 
may be supposed that if the Court is willing in cases involving the 
constitutional rights of criminal defendants to regard error in favor of 
one party as no more serious than error in favor of the other, which, 
as the dissenters in Lego suggested, is the inference drawn from ap-
plication of the civil standard,39 then a special quantum of evidence in 
mere libel cases should certainly not be required. If this result is 
achieved, it ought to be frankly acknowledged that the "clear and 
convincing evidence" language has been abandoned and not merely 
interpreted. 
Another aspect of Gertz worthy of attention is that of the meaning 
given to the knowing falsity standard. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 40 Jus-
32 "Moreover, in contrast to proof by clear and convincing evidence required under 
the Times test, the burden of proof for reasonable care will doubtless be the preponder-
ance of the evidence." Gertz,'418 U.S. at 366 (Brennan, J. dissenting). See Monitor Pa-
triot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275-76 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 
801, 807 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Goldwater v. 
Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969): 
T.he Times decision changed state libel law only to the extent of requiring public 
officials to prove actual malice with convincing clarity [citation omitted]. Other 
elements of proof, such as that statements were written and that the statements 
were communicated to third persons, need only be proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence .... 
Id. at 341; Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071, 1073-74 (N.D. Cal. 1969), affd, 
449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1971). See also T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expres-
sion ( 1970). 
33 404 U.S. 477 (1972). This was a 4-3 decision with Justices Powell and Rehnquist 
not participating. 
34 Id. at 486-87. 
35 Id. at 488. 
36 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
37 404 U.S. at 487-88. 
38 384 U.S. at 475. 
39 404 U.S. at 493 (dissenting opinion). 
40 390 u.s. 727 ( 1968). 
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tice White, speaking for the Court, observed: 
[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably 
prudent man would have published, or would have investigated 
before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the con-
clusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth 
of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disre-
gard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual maliceY 
In Gertz, the Court defined this standard in more explicit terms, 
stating that reckless disregard involves "subjective awareness of prob-
able falsity." 42 On the other hand, a showing of "personal spite, ill will 
or a desire to injure plaintiff" is not required.43 Thus,· subjective 
awareness but not malice in the traditional sense is required. It is for 
this reason that the Court now avoids use of the phrase "actual 
malice" to describe the New York Times standard.44 
The Court in Gertz also amplified its definitions of "public figure" 
and "public official." The plaintiff in Gertz was an attorney who, in a 
civil suit, represented the family of a man who had been murdered by 
a police officer. The defamatory publication, consisting of an accusa-
tion that the plaintiff was a "communist-fronter" who had participated 
in a Communist conspiracy to "frame" the police officer, occurred in 
connection with this litigation. After dismissing the defendant's con-
tention that plaintiff's brief service on local housing committees sev-
eral years prior to the events in question made him a "public 
official,"45 the Court discussed the "public figure" concept. One may 
become a public figure for all purposes if he has a pervasive fame or 
notoriety; one can also become a public figure with respect to a par-
ticular area of public concern.46 The Court concluded that the plain-
tiff was not a public figure in the general sense, and that since his in-
volvement in the instant controversy had been restricted to the collat-
eral civil litigation and he had not given press interviews, he was not a 
public figure in the more limited sense eitherY 
A final noteworthy problem in the libel area still unresolved is that 
of whether courts, in view of the fact that defamed private individuals 
must show at least negligence to receive damages, can compel a de-
fendant publisher to publish either a retraction or a court's determi-
nation of falsity. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 48 decided 
41 Id. at 731 (emphasis added). 
42 418 U.S. at·334 n.6. Accord, Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 1974 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 699, 311 N.E.2d at 57. 
43 Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967) (per curiam). 
44 See note 7 supra. 
45 418 U.S. at 351. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 351-52. 
48 418 u.s. 241 (1974). 
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the same day as Gertz, the Court held unconstitutional a Florida stat-
ute granting a "right to reply" to any political candidate "assailed" in 
the columns of a newspaper. 49 Although Tornillo was a unanimous de-
cision, Justice White noted in a concurring opinion that the combina-
tion of Gertz and Tornillo subjects the interest in a person's reputation 
to the mercy of the press. 50 Justice Brennan, joined in his concurring 
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, explicitly reserved the retraction issue. 51 
Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Gertz, Justice Brennan suggested 
that a plaintiff who is the subject of a false publication but is unable to 
satisfy the constitutional standards of fault could be vindicated short 
of damages by either: (1) enactment of statutes requiring a publisher 
of a defamatory falsehood to publish either a retraction or a state-
ment of a court's determination of falsity; or (2) at the least, extension 
of the right to the plaintiff to "secure a judgment upon the truth or 
falsity of statements published about him."52 
Allowing such remedies would not imperil First Amendment values 
as did the Tornillo statute because relief would be predicated on proof 
of a defamatory falsehood, as opposed to merely any criticism. A judi-
cial declaration of the falsity of the defamatory statement, without 
provision for coercive relief, would not impinge on First Amendment 
values in any significant way at all. It must be borne in mind that in 
New York Times the Court had expressed concern that awards of dam-
ages might be so vast that even powerful newspapers would be faced 
with going under upon satisfaction of the judgment. 5 3 Needless to say, 
if faced with such possibilities, all but the most intrepid publisher 
would be inclined to approach controversial areas with diffidence. On 
the other hand, if "faultless" error by publishers resulted in no worse 
sanction than either a judicial declaration of the erroneous nature of 
the publication or, at most, the requiring of a retraction, the inhibit-
ing influence on publishing would be minimal. 
§10.2. State action and equal protection in collegiate ath-
letics. Dean Prosser once observed that the Palsgraf case was "a 
law professor's dream of an examination question."1 If so, Buckton v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Association,2 decided by the federal District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts, is perhaps a model problem 
49 Id. at 254-58. 
50 Id. at 262-63 (White, J., concurring). 
51 Id. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
52 418 U.S. at 368 n.3. (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also T. Emerson, The System of 
Freedom of Expression 539 (1970); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 800-01 
(4thed.1971). 
53 376 U.S. at 278. 
§10.2. 1 W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 254 (4th ed. 1971). 
2 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973). 
7
Cronin: Chapter 10: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1974
194 1974 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §10.2 
for a seminar in constitutional litigation. 
The plaintiffs, two Canadian nationals residing in Boston, were 
skilled hockey players for Boston University. The defendants were the 
Eastern College Athletic Conference (ECAC), the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA), both unincorporated associations of col-
leges, and, at least nominally, Boston University (B.U.) itself. Boston 
University, under compulsion by the ECAC and NCAA, had declared 
the plaintiffs ineligible to play hockey because of violations of their 
amateur status. The conclusion of ineligibility was premised upon the 
finding that the plaintiffs, while playing Major Junior A hockey in 
Canada, had received funds for room, board and expenses from the 
sponsor of the hockey team. This policy is open and legitimate in 
Canada but differs from the American practice in that the support for 
Canadian Junior hockey comes not from schools ·but from certain civic 
groups. 3 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants could not deprive 
them of eligibility to play hockey under these circumstances despite 
the explicit provisions of the constitution and bylaws of the defendant 
organizations.4 After an assessment of the application of equitable 
principles and a discussion of the constitutional problems of "state ac-
tion" and "equal protection," the district court granted a preliminary 
injunction against the declaration of ineligibility.5 
Although the complaint set forth three causes of action, Count II, a 
civil rights claim alleging a denial of equal protection, is of principal 
interest. 6 Section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code guaran-
tees equal rights to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States, 7 and section 1983 provides a remedy for state deprivation of 
rights secured by the United States Constitution. 8 Thus, the viability 
3 Id. at 1157-59. 
4 Id. The defendant organizations' constitution and bylaws provide: "Any student-
athlete who has participated as a member of the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association 
major junior A hockey classification shall not be eligible for intercollegiate athletics." Id. 
at 1155, quoting N.C.A.A. Const. art. 3, § 1 (1973-74); E.C.A.C. Bylaws art. 3, § 1 
(1972). 
5 366 F. Supp. at 1160. 
6 Count I stated a diversity claim alleging tortious interference with contractual rela-
tions. Count III stated an antitrust claim under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 
(1970) and §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U .S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970). Given its disposi-
tion of Count II, the court found it unnecessary to discuss Counts I and III. 366 F. 
Supp. at 1155-56. 
7 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), which provides: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in 
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the se-
curity of persons and propeny as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject 
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, 
and to no other. 
8 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
8
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of the plaintiff's claim was dependent upon a demonstration of state 
involvement in the denial of equal protection. This comment will first 
address the issue of state action and will then examine the validity of 
the plaintiff's equal protection claim. 
To succeed on their section 1983 claim, plaintiffs had to show that 
the defendants were acting under color of state law and not merely as 
private organizations. 9 This state action problem involves two sub-
theories that are analytically distinct. In order to sustain a finding of 
state action, the plaintiff must prove either that: ( 1) private action has 
been so entangled with governmental policies that the private activity 
is attributed to the state; 10 or (2) organizations have performed ac-
tivities so governmental in nature that they will be treated as if they 
were the government. 11 In Buckton the court treated the facts as en-
compassing both subtheories12 and concluded that the requisite state 
action existed as to B. U. and the NCAA. 13 The factors emphasized 
were: 
1. B.U. performs a governmental function by providing higher 
education and exercising substantial dominion over its students. 
2. The NCAA, by supervising intercollegiate athletics, performs 
a public function. 
3. State universities comprise one half of the membership of 
the United States or other persons within .the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action of law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceedings for redress. 
9 See id. There is little if any distinction between "state action" under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and "under color of" state law in § 1983. See Fletcher v. Rhode Island 
Hosp. Trust Nat'! Bank, 496 F.2d 927, 929 n.4 (lst Cir. 1974). 
The court confined its discussion to § 1983, making no further reference to § 1981. 
The weight of authority is that no state action requirement exists for § 1981. See Mack-
lin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Sims v. Order of 
United Commercial Travelers of America, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1972). Contra, 
Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Ala. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 458 
F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972). 
10 "Conduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental 
policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the 
constitutional limitations placed upon state action." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 
(1966). See Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Moose Lodge v. lrvis, 407 
U.S. 163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
11 Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); 
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
12 366 F. Supp. at 1156-57. Although a logical case could be made for insisting that 
the "public function" aspect of a case should not be mixed with the "governmental in-
volvement" aspect, courts have treated them together and ruled that state action could 
be found based on the combination of the two. See Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 
F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781, 784 (lst Cir. 1971). 
13 366 F. Supp. at 1157. The ECAC was not made subject to the preliminary injunc-
tion because it stipulated that it would take no action against B.U. for obeying a court 
order, even if the order were to be vacated after a hearing on the merits. ld. at 1155. 
9
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and pay dues to the NCAA; state facilities are provided for 
NCAA contests. 
4. B.U. is incorporated by the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts;14 during 1973 B.U. received approximately $55,000 
from the Commonwealth; B.U. utilizes state-owned facilities for 
athletic events. 15 
In deciding cases involving the issue of state action, it is particularly 
necessary for courts to make judgments based on the facts of the par-
ticular case. Thus one cannot really say that the court was "right" or 
"wrong" on the state action issue. There are, however, some factors 
not discussed by the court that point away from t~e conclusion that 
state action was present in Buckton. First, although there was signifi-
cant state involvement with the defendant private institutions, the 
state was neither involved in nor tended to promote the activity which 
caused plaintiff's injury. 16 This is a far different situation than where, 
for example, scholarship money derived from governmental sources 
was being allocated in a discriminatory way. Second, although the de-
fendant organizations perform what is in a certain sense a "public 
function," such function is not traditionally performed exclusively, or 
even principally, by the state, 17 in contrast to Marsh v. Alabama 18 and 
Evans v. Newton, 19 the leading public function cases. Indeed, there is 
the countervailing consideration of the desirability in the educational 
field of preserving a private sector free of the restraints that apply to 
14 This factor is almost certainly make-weight. "The Court has never held, of course, 
that discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be violative of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the 
State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever." Moose Lodge v. 
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1974). 
15 366 F. Supp. at 1156-57. Since the decision of the court in Buckton, the Supreme 
Court handed down its decision in Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974). This 
case involved a challenge to the use of public recreation facilities by all-white private 
groups in the context of pending court orders to desegregate the public parks and 
school systems. The Court held that allocation of exclusive possession of public facilities 
to all-white private groups implicated the state in the groups' private discrimination, but 
that the record provided an insufficient basis for any conclusion when use by private 
groups was non-exclusive. Id. at 569-74. 
16 See Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-76 (1974); Fletcher v. Rhode Island 
Hosp. Trust Nat'! Bank, 496 F.2d 927, 932 (1st Cir. 1974); Junior Chamber of Com-
merce, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883, 886-87 (lOth Cir. 1974); Browns v. 
Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593, 596 (lOth Cir. 1969); Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 
791, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
17 In Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court found the intent of 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment unclear on the issue of public school seg-
regation because education was largely in private hands at the time of the adoption of 
the amendment. Id. at 489-90. 
18 326 u.s. 501 (1946). 
19 382 u.s. 296 (1966). 
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governmental agencies. 20 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has 
been an especially turbulent area of constitutional law during the past 
decade. Traditionally the Court had been very reluctant to entertain 
equal protection claims,21 sustaining legislative classification as long as 
a rational basis existed for the statutory treatment.22 More recently 
the Court has required that classifications that are "suspect"23 or cur-
tail "fundamental rights"24 be justified by a "compelling state interest." 
While no fundamental right in this technical sense seems to be in-
volved in Buckton,25 "alienage" is one of the classifications that has 
triggered the stricter scrutiny of the new equal protection. 26 As the 
court noted, the plaintiffs are, in effect, classified differently because 
they are resident aliens; therefore, the classification must fall unless 
supported by some compelling state interestP The court concluded 
that while the interest in preserving amateurism is entirely legitimate, 
the interest in such preservation by means of the discrimination in-
volved in this case was not, to say the least, compelling. 28 Realistically, 
Canadian boys are no more professionalized by receiving money from 
civic groups than American boys are by receiving money from schools. 
Moreover, Canadian boys of high school age wishing to play hockey 
on an organized level have no alternative but to do so on the basis of 
opportunities made available to them in their native land. Thus, the 
state interest, given the suspicion with which classifications affecting 
aliens is currently regarded, was found wanting. 
The court's application in Buckton of a strict standard of scrutiny is 
appealing on the facts and perhaps serves as a good illustration of 
20 See Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1974). For a discussion of 
the state action problem as applied to private colleges, see generally Schubert, State Ac-
tion and the Private University, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 323 (1970), in which the author 
concludes that courts have generally not found activities of private universities to in-
volve state action. 
21 In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), a case involving the involuntary sterilization 
of a feeble-minded person, Justice Holmes described an equal protection challenge as 
"the usual last resort of constitutional arguments .... " Id. at 208. 
22 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. 
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
23 See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (illegitimacy); 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 
(1963) (race). 
24 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 
( 1956) (equal access to appellate review in criminal cases). 
25 Education is not a "fundamental" constitutional right. San Antonio Indep. School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 29-39 (1973). 
26 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
27 366 F. Supp. at 1157. 
2 8 Id. at 1158-60. 
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why some problems require a judicial rather than political response. 
The plaintiffs in this case are, personally at least, politically powerless. 
Discrimination against aliens is an age-old problem that resists satisfac-
tory political resolution. Thus, perhaps it is justifiable for the courts to 
stretch a point in their favor. Indeed, one suspects that the court's 
view of the state action problem in such a case is influenced by the 
type of equal protection violation that is alleged. 29 
This special solicitude for aliens should be assessed, however, in 
light of the dissatisfaction that has been expressed both on and off the 
Supreme Court in the recent past with the use of certain "suspect 
classifications" and "fundamental rights" as trip-wires for severe judi-
cial scrutiny, while other classifications receive virtually no scrutiny at 
all. 30 The two standards may be enough to handle cases at the ends of 
the spectrum, e.g., racial classifications closely scrutinized and ordinary 
economic legislation treated with profound deference to the legislative 
judgment. The problem cases, of course, fall between these extremes. 
Increasingly, the Supreme Court is tending toward the position that 
the amount of justification required for a classification must be sensi-
tively proportioned to the potential invidiousness of the classification 
and the importance of the rights affected by it. 31 The risk of subjectiv-
ity in making assessments such as these is obvious, but assumption of 
such a risk is necessary if the courts are to avoid either deciding cases 
on the basis of superficial labels, or, on the other hand, effectively 
withdrawing from the equal protection field altogether. 
Even judged by this more refined standard, the result reached in 
Buckton seems entirely defensible. The controlling factor ultimately is 
that the interest in protecting amateurism is so little advanced by the 
regulation under attack, at least on the facts before the court at the 
injunction stage, that the classification must fall. Alienage is in some 
29 A less onerous test for state action is sometimes applied where discrimination based 
on race is alleged. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 628 (2d Cir. 1974); 
Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See Fletcher v. Rhode 
Island Hosp. Trust Nat'! Bank, 496 F.2d 927,931 (1st Cir. 1974). 
30 See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San An-
tonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall,]., dissent-
ing). See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1973). 
31 See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140-42 (1972). This is especially true in the 
area of sex discrimination where the majority of the Court has declined to regard clas-
sification based on sex as suspect, but where the degree of scrutiny is clearly somewhat 
exacting. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971). It is unclear whether 
there is now a "substantial relationship" test, i.e., an intermediate standard between the 
"mere rationality" test and the "compelling interest test," or whether there is now a 
whole spectrum of equal protection tests, depending on an assessment of all the vari-
ables involved. See Kahn, 416 U.S. at 355; Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions, 87 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1534, 1535 n.9 (1974). 
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degree suspect. 32 In addition, the deprivation of plaintiffs' right to 
engage in sports free from discrimination could have adversely af-
fected their potential for a subsequent professional career. Thus, a 
showing of a substantial state interest in the classification would be re-
quired to justify it. No such showing was forthcoming. sa 
§10.3. Justiciability of challenges to delays in the courts. The 
delays in the justice system, civil and criminal, have increasingly be-
come a source of frustration and dissatisfaction. Although defendants 
can win the dismissal of charges in the criminal sphere because of the 
denial of a speedy trial, 1 this remedy results in satisfaction only to the 
defendants themselves and is, in any event, hardly a solution. In Ad 
Hoc Committee on Judicial Administration v. Massachusetts, 2 the plaintiffs, 
an association of attorneys and a litigant in a pending civil action, 
brought suit in federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
claiming that the failure of the Commonwealth to provide sufficient 
judges, support facilities and personnel to enable the courts to keep 
abreast of their dockets was a violation of the plaintiffs' rights under 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 3 
The district court dismissed the action on the grounds that the 
complaint failed to state a justiciable cause of action4 and that the 
Eleventh Amendment barred the action.5 The Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit, after a brief and inconclusive assessment of the ef-
fect of the Eleventh Amendment on the case, 6 affirmed the trial 
court's alternate holding that no justiciable controversy was 
presented. 7 
32 Buckton is really not a typical alien case since it is in the interest of many persons 
influential in the preparation of the regulations in question to see that the interests of 
these "aliens" are not unduly neglected. In any event, arguably, alienage should be less 
suspect than race as a classification because it is a status not necessarily beyond the 
power of the individual to change. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 
(1974). 
33 On June 19, 197 4, before the completion of the taking of testimony on the merits, 
the court issued a decree consented to by the plaintiffs as well as by B.U. and the 
ECAC. The ECAC agreed to restore the eligibility of the plaintiffs by granting excep-
tions and to recommend a similar course of action to the NCAA. In addition, the 
ECAC adopted a revised affidavit form to be compl~ted by each student-athlete who in-
tends to participate in intercollegiate ice hockey in order to facilitate the colleges' en-
forcing of the ECAC eligibility rules. 
§10.3. 1 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
2 488 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974). 
3 358 F. Supp. 953, 955 (D. Mass. 1973). 
4 Id. at 956-59. 
5 Id. at 960. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to ex-
tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. 
Const. amend. XI. 
6 488 F.2d at 1243. For a more recent comprehensive statement by the Supreme 
Court on the Eleventh Amendment, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
7 488 F.2d at 1244-46. 
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A non-justiciable question is one that is not suitable for judicial res-
olution: 
Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope. 
Its reach is illustrated by the various grounds upon which ques-
tions sought to be adjudicated in federal courts have been held 
not to be justiciable. Thus, no justiciable controversy is presented 
when the parties seek adjudication of only a political question, 
when the parties are asking for an advisory opinion, when the 
question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent 
developments, and when there is no standing to maintain the ac-
tion. Yet it remains true that "[j]usticiability is ... not a legal con-
cept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification. 
Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures .... "8 
Thus, the political question doctrine, which apparently was involved 
in Ad Hoc Committee, concerns only one area of cases that are non-
justiciable. Political questions are non-justiciable not because of a con-
cern for political rights, 9 but because such matters are properly com-
mitted for final decision to the political departments of the govern-
ment, i.e., the legislative and executive. 10 Thus, questions concerning 
the discipline of the national guard are non-justiciable because the 
Constitution textually commits this matter to the legislative branch; 11 
likewise, questions concerning the reasonable time for pendency of a 
proposed constitutional amendment are non-justiciable because of the 
lack of standards that could be applied by courts.12 
The First Circuit regarded this case as non-justiciable for several 
reasons: 
1. The degree of delay that is constitutionally intolerable can-
not be quantified apart from particular cases and thus no gener-
ally applicable timetable could be formulated; 13 
2. No suitable remedy could be molded. More manpower and 
physical resources may not be the answer. The courthouses may 
have to be closed to certain types of litigation;14 and 
3. Federal courts should be most reluctant to reorder state 
priorities by compelling additional funding for a service, where 
the state does not realistically have the alternative of discontinuing 
the service altogether. 15 
8 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). 
9 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 
(1927). 
10 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 18q, 210 (1962). 
11 Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). 
12 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939). 
13 488 F.2d at 1244. 
14 Id. at 1245. 
15 Id. at 1245-46. 
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Upon first reflection, the court's refusal to become, in effect, a re-
ceiver for the state court system seems mandated by common sense, 
for which there is still something to be said in constitutional law. "It is 
the cardinal principle at least of American constitutional interpreta-
tion that the Constitution is to be interpreted so as to be workable and 
reasonable. This principle does not collide with respect for the intent 
of the Framers because their transcendent intent was to build just 
such a Constitution. "16 Moreover, the criteria of Baker v. Carr, 17 the 
leading political question case, seem to be satisifed because Ad Hoc 
Committee would require the application of standards and the exercise 
of discretion usually associated with the political branches of 
government. 18 
Nevertheless, there is one respect in which Ad Hoc Committee is an 
anomaly as a political question case. Baker v. Carr teaches that "it is the 
relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the 
Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to 
the States, which gives rise to the political question."19 In Ad Hoc 
Committee no such conflict of competence with a coordinate branch of 
the federal government is presented. If the First Circuit had addres-
sed this problem in its opinion, a discussion of the Supreme Court's 
opinion in O'Brien v. Brown 20 would have been pertinent. In O'Brien, 
the Supreme Court was asked to review a decision by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that had ruled 
on the merits of disputes concerning the seating of delegates at the 
1972 Democratic National Convention.zt Technically, the Supreme 
Court in its per curiam opinion merely granted a stay of the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals and did not even rule on the petitions 
for certiorari. As a practical matter, however, the Court, as it 
acknowledged, was simply allowing the cases to become moot. 22 It 
acted in this manner largely because of doubts concerning the jus-
ticiability of the case: 
No case is cited to us in which any federal court has undertaken 
to inject itself into the deliberative processes of a national political 
convention; no holding of this Court up to now gives support for 
judicial intervention in the circumstances presented here, involv-
ing as they do, relationships of great delicacy that are essentially 
political in nature. 23 
16 C. Black, Impeachment: A Handbook 4 (1974). 
17 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
18 Seeid.at217. 
19 Id. at 210. Compare Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) with Bond 
v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
20 409 U.S. I (1972). 
21 Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
22 409 U.S. at 5. 
23 Id. at 4. 
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Yet, as Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent, the Democratic Na-
tional Convention is not a coordinate branch of government.24 Al-
though one might suppose that judicial intervention in the delibera-
tions of the convention would collide with any ultimate power of 
Congress to control federal elections, 25 the majority in O'Brien did not 
even urge this rationale as its reason for doubts as to justiciability. 
Perhaps the gloss that O'Brien provides on Baker v. Carr is that a 
conflict with a coordinate branch of the federal government is a pre-
supposition of the political question doctrine only in those cases where 
the reason for non-justiciability is rooted in the Constitution itself, i.e., 
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a problem to 
another department, and not where the reason for non-justiciability is 
rooted in discretion, e.g., lack of judicially manageable standards. 26 
While the implications of O'Brien have not all been spun out, the 
case does lend support to the decision of the First Circuit in Ad Hoc 
Committee. The problem of delays in the justice system seems to be one 
that must be left to the political departments. Such a result should not 
be disturbing simply because state political departments seem to be 
left with unreviewable power to control federally guaranteed rights. 
For those who would be uncomfortable with the notion that there 
could be no recourse from a state legislative decision on a federal con-
stitutional issue, it may be suggested that Congress has authority 
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy any per-
ceived state violations of due process and equal protection.27 
§10.4. Legislation: Criminal law: Scope of search incident to 
arrest. Chapter 508 of the Acts of 1974 provides: 
A search conducted incident to an arrest may be made only for 
the purpose of seizing fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and 
other evidence of the crime for which the arrest has been made, 
in order to prevent its destruction or concealment; and removing 
any weapons that the arrestee might use to resist arrest or effect 
his escape. Property seized as a result of a search in violation of 
the provisions of this paragraph shall not be admissible in evi-
24 I d. at 11-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas joined in the dissent. 
25 Art. II, § I of the Constitution appears to leave the appointment of presidential 
electors up to the states entirely. For the view, however, that Congress has ultimate au-
thority to insure that officers selected in presidential elections represent their national 
constituency, see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 n.7 (1970). 
26 This question merges with the broader issue of whether the political question doc-
trine is entirely constitutional in scope or whether there is an element of judicial discre-
tion as well. Compare Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1959) with Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreword: The 
Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rei!. 40, 46 (1961). See also Commonwealth v. Laird, 451 
F.2d 26,31 (lst Cir. 1971). 
27 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 64 
(1966). 
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dence in criminal proceedings. 1 
The enactment of this statute is a reaction to recent Fourth 
Amendment decisions by the Supreme Court. In 1969 in Chime! v. 
California, 2 the Court, in discussing the bounds of a legitimate search 
incident to arrest, held that an arresting officer has the right, without 
a warrant, to search the person arrested and to seize weapons or de-
structible evidence either on the arrestee's person or in areas within 
his immediate control. 3 The Court further held in 1971 in Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire 4 that "an object which comes into view during a search 
incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing 
law may be seized without a warrant."5 
Certain questions that remained open were subsequently treated in 
the related cases of United States v. Robinson6 and Gustafson v. Florida 7 
in 1973. There the Court distinguished between two different 
branches of the search incident to arrest: (1) the search of the person 
of the arrestee; and (2) the search of the area within the control of the 
arrestee. The Court held that, even in the context of a routine motor 
vehicle violation, the police may effect a search of the person as long 
as there is an actual in-custody arrest and not merely a citation or 
summons. 8 Such a search is permissible even though the offense is 
one for which there could be no evidence or fruits and the circum-
stances do not suggest the presence of a weapon.9 Moreover, the 
search may be a complete one10 rather than merely a "frisk,'' 11 i.e., 
apparently anything short of an exploration of body cavities. Thus, if 
§ 1 0.4. 1 Acts of 1974, c. 508. 
2 395 u.s. 752 (1969). 
3 Id. at 762-63. 
4 403 U.S. 433 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
5 Id. at 465. Coolidge suggests that there is a difference between the "plain view" ex-
ception to the search warrant requirement and the "plain view" aspect of the search-
incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement. It is a general principle that as 
long as the police are in a place they have a right to be, they may seize evidence with 
probable cause but without a warrant, provided they come upon it inadvertently. ld. at 
469-71. The inadvertence requirement is dispensed with if the seized items are con-
traband, stolen or dangerous in themselves. Id. at 471. If, however, during the course 
of and within the scope of a search incident to arrest the police find other evidence 
which there is probable cause to seize, the inadvertence requirement is disregarded. Id. 
at 465 & n.24. 
A further complication comes from the fact that it is controverted whether the "inad-
vertence" analysis of Coolidge commanded the assent of as many as five justices even in 
Coolidge itself. See North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 307-08, 502 P.2d 1305, 
1308-09, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833,836-37 (1972). 
6 414 u.s. 218 (1973). 
7 414 u.s. 260 (1973). 
8 414 U.S. at 236. 
9 Id. at 234-35. 
10 Id. at 227-29. 
11 See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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heroin is discovered in a search of a cigarette package, the arrestee 
may then be prosecuted for possession. 
A dissent by Justice Marshall raises several criticisms. 12 First, con-
trary to earlier cases, the reasonableness of the search was judged in 
the abstract rather than with reference to the facts of the particular 
case. 13 Thus while the need to prevent the destruction of evidence is 
one of the justifications for a search incident to arrest,14 after Robinson 
the police, in order to justify a complete search of the person, will not 
have to consider whether the search will yield evidence of an ordinary 
motor vehicle violation. 15 Further, cases such as Robinson and Gustafson 
have often been thought to occur as a result of "pretext" arrests. For 
example, the police may observe particular conduct, such as motor 
vehicle violations or vagrancy, for which an arrest would not ordinar-
ily be effected. If, however, they suspect, but do not have reasonable 
cause to believe, that an individual is guilty of certain unrelated con-
duct, the police may be tempted to arrest for the minor violation in 
order to have the opportunity to search. Thus, as a practical matter, 
the arrest is incident to the search. Although the Court in Robinson 
purported to reserve the "pretext" question, 16 in the normal case a 
pretext arrest would be a difficult matter to prove unless the police 
were candid enough to admit to it. Courts generally eschew inquiry 
into the analogous area of the unconstitutional legislative motive, 
which, if anything, presents fewer problems.17 
Justice Marshall also expressed doubt about the willingness of the 
Court to apply its own principles even-handedly to "white collar" per-
sons who find themselves taken into custody for minor traffic of-
fenses: 
One wonders if the result in this case would have been the same 
12 414 U.S. at 238 (dissenting opinion). 
13 Id. at 239 (dissenting opinion). Justice Marshall's opinion notwithstanding, it does 
not appear that judging Fourth Amendment reasonableness by the generality of cases is 
unprecedented. Thus, with the possible exception of arrests that require an entry into a 
dwelling, it is generally agreed that felony arrests may be made without a warrant be-
cause exigent circumstances are so often present. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 465, 477-81 (1971). This rule is applied even though no exigent circumstances ap-
pear in the particular case. Arguably this situation is different from that of Robinson be-
cause while there is always some danger a felony suspect may suddenly flee, there are 
some crimes, of which Robinson is an example, for which there is no destructible evi-
dence. 
14 414 U.S. at 225-26, 235. 
15 Id. at 235. 
16 Id. at 221 n.l. 
17 "[N)o case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection 
solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it." Palmer v. Thompson, 
403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971). See generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach To 
The Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95; Ely, Legis-
lative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205 (1970). 
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were respondent a businessman who was lawfully taken into cus-
tody for driving without a license and whose wallet was taken 
from him by the police. Would it be reasonable for the police of-
ficer, because of the possibility that a razor blade was hidden 
somewhere in the wallet, to open it, remove all the contents, and 
examine each item carefully? Or suppose a lawyer lawfully ar-
rested for a traffic offense is found to have a sealed envelope on 
his person. Would it be permissible for the arresting officer to 
tear open the envelope in order to make sure that it did not con-
tain a clandestine weapon-perhaps a pin or a razor blade? 18 
The practical answer, one supposes, is that such offenders would not 
be taken into custody in the first place. 
It was in the context of these cases that the Massachusetts legisla-
ture passed chapter 508 of the Acts of 1974. This Act seems to pro-
vide substantially more protection to the individual than does the 
Fourth Amendment as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
Of course, this comparison in no way suggests that the Act is uncon-
stitutional; the state may provide greater though not lesser protections 
than those required by the federal constitution. 
Chapter 508, although somewhat ambiguous, seems to limit the 
seizure of evidence in a search incident to arrest to evidence con-
nected with the crime for which the arrest was made. 19 Thus, in the 
example discussed earlier, if one is arrested for a motor vehicle viola-
tion and a search yields illegally possessed narcotics, the narcotics may 
not be seized; and, if seizure is effected, the contraband will not be 
admissible as evidence. Equally, if one is arrested for armed robbery 
and searched, evidence connecting him with an unrelated murder 
should not be seized and, if seized, will be suppressed at trial. 
In interpreting the chapter, attention must be directed to the ques-
tion of whether or not the legislature intended to supplement the 
statutory language with the "plain view" doctrine. The Supreme Court 
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire held that an object which comes into 
plain view during a search incident to arrest may be seized without a 
warrant. 20 Massachusetts decisions have recognized the legitimacy of 
such seizures. 21 Since this view prevailed in the Commonwealth when 
chapter 508 was enacted and the legislature did not express an inten-
tion to overrule this case law, it should be presumed that the plain 
view doctrine does apply to searches incident to arrest. Thus, if some-
one arrested for robbery were searched for the fruits of the robbery 
and narcotics were found in plain view during a search tailored realis-
18 414 U.S. at 257 (dissenting opinion). 
19 See text at note 1 supra. 
20 See note 5 supra and accompanying text. 
21 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rand, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 296 N.E.2d 200. 
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tically to the robbery, the narcotics would be seizable. It is essential to 
the plain view doctrine that the police confine their search to the area 
where they have a right to be looking when the object comes into 
their plain view. 22 Thus, the statute as interpreted would not permit 
the type of search that took place in Robinson because such a search 
goes beyond the permissible scope dictated by the specific statutory 
purposes. 
Under this interpretation the primary difference between the scope 
of the search permitted by Robinson and that which would be permit-
ted by the statute is that Robinson permits a thorough search of the 
person without regard to whether evidence of the crime is likely to be 
found. The statute would require a search more precisely tailored to 
the statutory purposes based on the facts of the particular case. 
Chapter 508 also provides that weapons may be "removed" rather 
than "seized."23 Presumably, the proper interpretation of this provi-
sion is that weapons may be "seized" insofar as they happen to come 
within the earlier part of the statute as fruits, instrumentalities, con-
traband or evidence, but that in any event they may be "removed" 
from any person for the protection of the police and the prevention 
of escape. It should also be noted that other items which there is 
probable cause to seize might come into plain view during the course 
of such removal of weapons. If the search is properly tailored to the 
discovery of weapons, this evidence would be seizable. 
The enactment of this statute gave rise to demands for repeal even 
before the effective date.24 In response, Professor Lloyd Weinreb of 
Harvard Law School, who collaborated in the drafting of the Act, 
wrote a short commentary seeking to clarify and defend the statute.25 
The key portion of his analysis is as follows: 
The second sentence [of chapter 508] states that if property is 
seized as the result of an unlawful search, made for a purpose not 
mentioned in the statute, it is inadmissible as evidence in criminal 
proceedings. The plain meaning of the statute is that if a search is 
lawful, and property is lawfully seized, the property is admissible 
as evidence even if it is not within the category that prompted the 
search. For example, if a police officer makes a reasonable search 
for weapons following an arrest and unexpectedly finds con-
traband narcotics, the seized narcotics are admissible in evidence. 
That conclusion is consistent with a great many decisions allowing 
the seizure (and subsequent evidentiary use) of items unexpect-
edly discovered in plain view during a lawful search. For example: 
22 Coolidge v. New Hampshir~. 403 U.S. 443,465-66 (1971). 
23 See text at note 1 supra. 
24 Mass. Lawyers Weekly, Sept. 30, 1974, at 35. 
25 Id. 
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Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-473 (1971); Mar-
ron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); see Commonwealth v. 
Hawkins, 280 N .E.2d 665 (Mass. 1972). Of course an officer could 
not search a man's wallet and claim that the purpose of the search 
was to seize stolen automobile tires. Nor could he claim that a 
search was for weapons or means of escape unless he reasonably 
believed that the arrested person was armed or might try to 
escape.26 
This commentary on the statute presents several problems. First, it 
cites earlier cases such as Coolidge. The difficulty with this authority is 
that the statute was intended to forbid certain searches that had been 
permitted under prior law. 27 The statutory language does not in any 
way indicate that Coolidge is to be left undisturbed. Furthermore, if 
Coolidge does have precedential value in interpreting the statute, Pro-
fessor Weinreb has overlooked distinctions articulated in that Su-
preme Court decision. He makes it plain that the police may exceed 
the statutory bounds of a permissible search if contraband is 
unexpectedly discovered in plain view. Yet "inadvertence" is not a re-
quirement of the Coolidge case in regard to the plain view doctrine for 
the seizure of contraband or weapons. 28 In addition, he interprets the 
statute to forbid even searches for weapons unless there is reason to 
believe in the particular case that the arrested person was armed or 
might try to escape. There is no support for this position either in 
prior case law or the statute itself, which makes no mention of proba-
ble cause or reasonable belief, other than the implicit probable cause 
which provides the basis for the arrest.29 
It is obvious then that discussion about the wisdom of this statute 
will be clouded by disagreement as to its meaning. To the extent that 
the statute prevents the police from conducting searches of arrested 
persons of such a nature that there is no realistic possibility of turning 
up weapons or evidence of the crime for which the arrest is made, 
there should be no objection. Why, for example, if a person is ar-
rested for a motor vehicle violation, should police inspect cigarette 
packages or a wallet? The police, however, should not be forced to 
blind themselves to evidence that comes into their plain sight within 
the scope of the ordinary discharge of their responsibilities in making 
an arrest, whether the discovery was inadvertent or not. Further, 
when making an in-custody arrest, the police should be able in all 
cases to make a thorough search of the person for weapons. In light 
of the grave potential danger to the police in making any arrest, the 
26 ld. 
27 ld. 
28 See note 5 supra. 
2 9 See text at note l supra. 
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view of the Court in Robinson that the police should not have to specu-
late in a particular case whether the arrested person has weapons30 
seems eminently sound. 
§10.5. Right to appear prose. In Commonwealth v. Mott, 1 the Ap-
peals Court ruled that a defendant has the right under Article XII of 
the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution to appear 
pro se in a criminal case. Chief Justice Hale, speaking for the court, 
thought the question easy to decide because of the explicit language 
of the constitutional provision: "And every subject shall have a right 
. . . to be fully heard in his defense by himself, or his counsel, at his 
election."2 . 
The right to appear pro se, however, is not unqualified. Three limi-
tations are imposed on its exercise: (1) the request to appear pro se 
must be unequivocal; (2) the right must be asserted before trial; (3) 
the trial judge must be satisfied that the right to counsel is waived 
knowingly, and for a proper purpose, e.g., not for purposes of delay.3 
If these conditions are satisfied, the failure to honor a request to ap-
pear pro se calls for automatic reversal, with no room for application 
of the "harmless error" doctrine. This rule prevails even though there 
is no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 4 
In addition to its substantive importance, this case serves as a re-
minder that provisions of state constitutions often do not get the at-
tention they deserve, partly because of their almost total neglect in law 
schools. Such provisions are especially important where, as here, there 
is no clear counterpart in the federal constitution. Furthermore, even 
when the state provision seems substantially the same as a parallel 
federal provision, it may be subject to quite a different interpretation 
by statejudg~s5 • Such an interpretation would be beyond review by 
the Supreme Court of the United States as long as the construction of 
the state provision was bona fide and not merely an attempt to evade 
a binding interpretation of the federal constitution. 6 Thus, for exam-
ple, Justice Kaplan in his concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. 
Horton 7 suggested that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights might 
ao 414 U.S. at 234-35. 
§10.5. 1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 233, 308 N.E.2d 557. 
2 Mass. Const. pt. I, art. XII. 
3 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 236-37, 308 N.E.2d at 560. 
4 Id. at 237-38, 308 N.E.2d at 561. 
5 Compare Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955) with Murdock v. City of Mem-
phis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). 
6 C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 487-89 (2d ed. 1970). 
7 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 599, 61-3, 310 N.E.2d 316, 325 (concurring opinion). In this 
case the then current Massachusetts obscenity statute was found unconstitutional on 
vagueness grounds. 
Justice Kaplan did not refer to any specific state constitutional provision, but presum-
ably was referring to Article XVI of the Declaration of Rights. "The liberty of the press 
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warrant the conclusion that any state statute intruding "on the choice 
of an adult who knowingly and willingly seeks out a pornographic 
work" is unconstitutional. 8 Nevertheless, he acknowledged that this 
view is not now the prevailing interpretation of the federal constitu-
tion by the Supreme Court of the United States.9 
In Mott, the Appeals Court also referred briefly to the Sixth 
Amendment as a source of the right to appear pro se. 10 Although the 
court merely referred to the lack of controlling authority on this sub-
ject, an argument based on the existence of such a right deserves ex-
amination. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is fully binding on 
the states; 11 however, textually it is hard to find support in the 
Amendment for a right to appear on one's own behalf. 12 While a de-
fendant may constitutionally waive his right to counsel, 13 the proposi-
tion that a right of waiver implies the right to appear pro se is un-
sound. The fallaciousness of such an argument is demonstrated by the 
rejection of analogous ones in other areas of constitutional law. Thus, 
even if a defendant waives his right to a jury, he ordinarily cannot in-
sist on a bench trial if the prosecution by rule also has a right to a 
jury and does not so waive. 14 Similarly, the right to a public trial does 
not imply the right to insist on a private trialY 
The question then becomes whether there is some overwhelming 
policy supporting a right to appear pro se, such that the right should 
be deemed implicit in the Sixth Amendment or, perhaps more gener-
ally, in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
is essential to the security of freedom in a state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained 
in this commonwealth. The right of free speech shall not be abridged." Mass. Const. pt. 
I, art. XVI. 
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 613, 310 N.E.2d at 325 (concurring opinion). 
9 ld. 
10 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 236, 308 N.E.2d at 560. 
11 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). By statute, a party has the right 
to appear prose in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970). 
12 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the As-
sistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Whether there is such a 
federal constitutional right has been controverted. For an affirmative answer, see Ar-
nold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Plattner, 
330 F.2d 271, 274-75 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Adams v. United States ex rei. McCann, 
317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942). For the negative view, see Vann Nattan v. United States, 357 
F.2d 161, 163 (lOth Cir. 1966); Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 365 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959). 
A related question is whether a defendant has the right to simultaneously insist on 
counsel and participate in his own defense. The courts have not recognized such a 
right. See generally Comment, Self-Representation in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of 
the ProSe Defendant, 59 Calif. L. Rev. 1479 (1971). The wording of Article XII of the 
Declaration of Rights also seems to contemplate an either/or choice. See text at note 2 
supra. 
13 Adams v. United States ex rei. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942). 
14 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). 
15 ld. at 35. 
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Amendments. 16 The most persuasive argument is that any defendant, 
at least any defendant who has the willingness and ability to conduct a 
trial without disrupting orderly court procedures, should be free to 
present his case directly to the fact finder without an attorney as in-
termediary. A defendant might desire to represent himself for any 
one of several reasons: the case may be one that the defendant per-
ceives as political, with the trial affording a vehicle for dissemination 
of his beliefs, 17 or the defendant may have no technical defense but 
may think he is right in a moral sense and at least wants his own 
"say." Conversely, he may have a strong technical defense but may not 
want to put on such a defense. He may prefer to win or lose based on 
a straightforward presentation of the facts. 
An accused has a fundamental right to confront his accusers and 
his "country," to present himself and his position to the jury not 
merely as a witness or through a "mouthpiece," but as a man on 
trial who elects to plead his own cause. He is not obliged to seek 
what counsel would record as a victory but what he sees as tan-
tamount to condemnation or doubt rather than vindication. A de-
fendant has the moral right to stand alone in his hour of trial. 
The denial of that right is not to be redeemed through the prior 
estimate of someone else that the practical position of the defen-
dant will be enhanced through representation by another, or the 
subsequent conclusion that defendant's practical position has not 
been disadvantaged. 18 
Whether such considerations rise to the level of a constitutional ar-
gument depends on one's thoughts regarding these matters and one's 
perceptions of proper constitutional interpretation. In any event, the 
court in Mott was saved the difficulty of wrestling with this problem by 
the explicit provision in Article XII of the Declaration of Rights. 
§I 0.6. Constitutionality of repossession statutes. In Mitchell v. 
W.T. Grant Co., 1 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
Louisiana sequestration statute which provided that a vendor-creditor 
could seize personal property without giving the purchaser-debtor an 
16 The question of the constitutional right to appear pro se is now before the Su-
preme Court. Faretta v. California (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 415 U.S. 975 (1974). 
17 In such a case, the question of the right to appear pro se is closely related to the 
dispute over the jury's right to find a defendant not guilty in the face of satisfactory 
proof of guilt. Of course, as a matter of power a jury can disregard the instructions of 
the court with impunity. If it finds the defendant not guilty, the case is ended. But does 
a jury have the right to acquit in the face of proof of guilt for any reason? The Su-
preme Court has held that a jury has no right to ignore instructions. Sparf v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 51, 64-107 (1895). Accord, Commonwealth v. Porter, 51 Mass. (10 
Met.) 263, 276 (1846). 
18 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
§10.6. I 416 U.S. 600 (1974). 
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opportunity for a hearing. Justice Powell, concurring with the opinion 
of the 5-4 majority; viewed the decision as a marked departure from 
recent pronouncements of the Court relating to repossession: 
In sweeping language, Fuentes v. Shevin . . . enunciated the prin-
ciple that the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process 
requires an adversary hearing before an individual may be tem-
porarily deprived of any possessory interest in tangible personal 
property, however brief the dispossession and however slight his 
monetary interest in the property. The Court's decision today 
withdraws significantly from the full reach of that principle, and 
to this extent I think it fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is 
overruled. 2 
This comment will consider (1) the extent that this decision repre-
sents a departure from Fuentes v. Shevin 3 and a repudiation of the 
lower court cases that have followed in the wake of Fuentes, and (2) 
the extent to which such a departure comports with the doctrine of 
stare decisis. 
Fuentes had its roots in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 4 which held 
that prejudgment garnishment of wages without a hearing is violative 
of due process. 5 It is apparent that Sniadach survives Mitchell. First, 
Sniadach involved wages, "a specialized type of property presenting 
distinct problems in our economic system."6 This point was em-
phasized in Sniadach, deemphasized in Fuentes when the Court refused 
to distinguish Sniadach on that basis, 7 but revitalized in Mitchell. 8 In 
addition, the suing creditor in Sniadach had no prior interest in the at-
tached property. There is a world of difference between allowing the 
seizure of personal property in which admittedly both the creditor 
and debtor have an interest and, on the other hand, allowing gar-
nishment or attachment of wages, bank accounts or real estate. In a 
case such as Sniadach, a potential plaintiff is merely interested in tying 
up property as security for a future judgment and does not claim to 
have a present interest in the property itself. 9 
2 Id. at 623 (concurring opinion) (citation omitted). 
3 407 u.s. 67 (1972). 
4 395 u.s. 337 (1969). 
5 Id. at 340-42. 
6 Id. 
7 407 U.S. at 88-90. 
• 416 U.S. at 616-18. 
9 As the Court noted in Mitchell: 
Plainly enough this is not a case where the property sequestered by the court is 
exclusively the property of the defendant debtor. The question is not whether a 
debtor's property may be seized by his creditors, pendente lite, where they hold no 
present interest in the property sought to be seized. The reality is that both seller 
and buyer had current, real interests in the property, and the definition of prop-
erty rights is a matter of state law. Resolution of the due process question must 
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The extent to which Mitchell modifies the law with respect to the 
precise type of problem presented in Fuentes is less certain. 10 Both 
Fuentes and Mitchell involved ex parte authorization for repossession 
of consumer goods. The Fuentes Court found that such repossession 
was violative of due process; 11 the Mitchell Court found that it was not 
a violation of due process, but purported to save Fuentes on its own 
facts. 12 
In distinguishing the two cases, the Court pointed to the following 
factors: in Mitchell, but not Fuentes, (1) state law required a clear show-
ing of specific facts and not merely a generalized claim of right to 
possession; (2) state law required that the showing be made to a judge 
and not merely a clerk; 13 and (3) the debtor was entitled to a prompt 
hearing on the merits after repossession. 14 
This analysis so depends on a comparison of the details of the stat-
utes involved in Fuentes and Mitchell that the teaching of the latter case 
for other jurisdictions is unclear, at least on the face of the opinion. It 
is perhaps a fair inference from the tone of the prevailing opinion in 
Mitchell that the Court would uphold the validity of any repossession 
statute that (a) required application to a judge rather than a clerk; (b) 
had the bond provisions of the Mitchell statute; 15 and (c) permitted 
debtor a prompt hearing on the merits. It is clear, however, that the 
Court has now adopted the viewpoint expressed in Justice White's dis-
sent in Fuentes that an inflexible constitutional rule is undesirable in 
take account not only of the interests of the buyer of the property but those of the 
seller as well. 
416 U.S. at 604. 
10 The Court made it plain that it did not in any event intend to repudiate the line of 
cases decided by lower courts on the authority of Fuentes: 
Our decision will not affect recent cases dealing with garnishment or summary 
self-help remedies of secured creditors or landlords. Nor is it at all clear, with an 
exception or two, that the reported cases invalidating replevin or similar statutes 
dealt with situations where there was judicial supervision of seizure or foreclosure 
from the outset. 
416 U.S. at 620 n.l4. For Massachusetts cases in this area, see Bay State Harness Horse 
Racing & Breeding Ass'n, Inc. v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973) 
(enjoining enforcement of Massachusetts attachment statute); Schneider v. Morgosian, 
349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972) (enjoining enforcement of Massachusetts trustee pro-
cess statute). Attachment and trustee process are now covered by new Mass. R. Civ. P. 
4.1 and 4.2 respectively. 
11 407 U.S. at 96. 
12 416 U.S. at 615-18. 
13 Even in Mitchell this requirement did not exist for the whole state of Louisiana, al-
though it did for the particular parish in which the writ of sequestration was obtained. 
416 u.s. 605-06. 
14 Id. at 616-18. 
15 Under the statute challenged in Mitchell, the creditor was obligated to post a bond 
pending a determination of the merits; and the debtor could, although he did not in 
Mitchell, regain possession pendente lite by posting his own bond. Id. at 608. 
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this area; 16 rather, there must be an assessment of the impact of pro-
cedural requirements on the cost of credit. 17 This approach necessar-
ily demands resolution of empirical questions which are peculiarly 
within the legislative province. Therefore, it would seem that a statute 
of the "Uniform Ad" variety, adopted after a determination that 
greater procedural protections would hurt rather than help consum-
ers because of the adverse effect on the cost of credit, would be 
constitutional. 18 
The dissenters in Mitchell did not merely indicate their dissatisfac-
tion with the substance of the Court's discussion, but also expressed 
dismay over the majority's refusal to apply the doctrine of stare de-
cisis. 
It seems to me that unless we respect the constitutional decisions 
of this Court, we can hardly expect others to do so .... A substan-
tial departure from precedent can only be justified, I had 
thought, in the light of experience with the application of the rule 
to be abandoned or in the light of an altered historic environ-
ment. Yet the Court today has unmistakably overruled a consid-
ered decision of this Court that is barely two years old, without 
pointing to any change in either societal perceptions or basic con-
16 407 U.S. 67, 101-02 (White, J., dissenting}. 
17 416 U.S. at 618 n.l3. One unspoken premise of the Mitchell majority may well be 
that as a practical matter these cases involve large corporate sellers and buyers of mod-
erate means or less. In these circumstances the seller is merely interested in receiving its 
payments promptly and has nothing to gain from frivolous repossessions. Garnish-
ments, however, particularly wage garnishments, would be subject to abuse by vindictive 
litigants who might not even have a substantial claim. See id. at 614. 
If this is so perhaps some distinctions need to be made within Fuentes. Fuentes actually 
involved five different cases, four of which concerned the usual default on payments of 
consumer goods. The other individual, Rosa Washington, "had been divorced from a 
local deputy sheriff and was engaged in a dispute with him over the custody of their 
son. Her former husb.and, being familiar with tlie routine forms used in the replevin 
process, had obtained a writ, that ordered the seizure of the boy's clothes, furniture and 
toys." 407 U.S. at 72. Whatever might be thought of the assumption that creditor-lien 
holders have benign intentions, such an assumption would certainly have no counter-
part in a case such as Rosa Washington's. 
18 The post-Mitchell cases have already begun and are hard to reconcile. In Woods v. 
Tennessee, 378 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D. Tenn. 1974}, a summary repossession statute sur-
vived constitutional attack despite the fact that the debtor could not regain possession 
by putting up a bond and could not obtain an immediate hearing on an application to 
dissolve the writ, both of which are features of the Mitchell statute. 
In Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974}, the Texas sequestration 
procedure was declared unconstitutional on the authority of Mitchell. The Court read 
Mitchell as emphasizing: (1} a clear showing by creditor of fear that debtor would con-
ceal, dispose of, or waste the property; (2} the requirement that the writ be issued by a 
judge; (3} that the debtor was entitled to a full hearing on the merits immediately. The 
Court, placing particular emphasis on the second factor, found the Texas statute defi-
cient in all three respects and thus unconstitutional. ld. at 1258-60. 
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stitutional understandings that might justify this total disregard of 
stare decisis. 19 
This problem arose because of a change in membership of the 
Court between Fuentes and Mitchell. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did 
not participate in Fuentes because they had not been members of the 
Court at the time of the argument. Justice White, with whom Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined, wrote in dissent. Thus, 
Justice Stewart's opinion of the Court represented the view of only 
four justices. In Mitchell, Justice White, joined by the other dissenters 
in Fuentes as well as by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, wrote the ma-
jority opinion. The four justices who comprised the working majority 
in Fuentes dissented in Mitchell, with Justice Stewart writing the princi-
pal dissent. 
Thus the explanation in Mitchell of Fuentes' "real" meaning was ar-
ticulated by those who had not been part of the Fuentes majority. This 
is not the first time, however, that limitations have been placed on a 
case solely or principally because of changes in membership on the 
Court. 20 In any event, Mitchell was not the most suitable case for the 
dissenters to decry a departure from stare decisis. First, as Justice 
Powell noted in his concurring opinion in Mitchell, Fuentes itself can be 
regarded as a break with precedent. 21 Moreover, the Court has gen-
erally taken the position that broad rules should not be announced 
when unnecessary to dispose of the case, especially where constitu-
19 416 U.S. at 634-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Even the dissenters, 
however, would not claim that due process inflexibly requires notice and hearing before 
seizure of property in all circumstances, See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing 
Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
2° Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) with Harris v. New York, 401 
U.S. 222 (1971); compare United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) with Kirby v. Il-
linois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). For an incisive analysis of the Miranda-Harris sequence, see 
Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations of the Candor and 
Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 Yale L.J. 1198 (1971). In regard to the 
Wade-Kirby sequence, see Commonwealth v. Horton, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 599, 310 
N.E.2d 316: 
[C]ertain crucial rules relating to the right to counsel as established in United 
States v. Wade ... and Gilbert v. California ... were all but vacated by the severe 
limitations of Kirby v. Illinois ... just five years later. Likewise, the relative cer-
tainty concerning search and seizures related to automobiles, as established by 
Chambers v. Maroney ... was cast into confusion by Coolidge v. New Hampshire 
the very next year .... Certainly constitutional interpretation must respond to so-
cial change, but this duty does not explain speedy overruling of new doctrines. 
These turn-arounds are followed by serious consequences to many people in every 
community. Especially in the area of constitutional-criminal law all concerned are 
entitled to a substantial measure of stability and predictability. 
Id. at 612-13,310 N.E.2d at 324-25 (Hennessey, J., concurring). 
21 416 U.S. at 624 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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tional matters are in issue.22 While this rule is perhaps one of pru-
dence only, and there have been cases where the Court has ignored it 
altogether,23 Fuentes was a case in which the Court should have taken 
special pains to restrict discussion to the statutes before it rather than 
to announce a rule of unnecessary generality. It was, after all, a 4-3 
decision, where there was reason to believe that in these matters the 
two new justices would agree with the minority rather than the major-
ity. Thus, it may be said that the spectacle of the Court's undercutting 
a broad principle recently announced and widely applied was not 
caused by the Mitchell majority's disrespect for precedent, but rather 
by the attempt in Fuentes to preempt an entire area of due process 
litigation before the voting make-up of the Court altered. 
STUDENT CoMMENTS 
§10.7. Newsman privilege: Dow ]ones & Co. v. Superior Court. 1 
Petitioner Liz Roman Gallese was a staff reporter for the Wall 
Street Journal (hereinafter the Journal), which is published by co-
petitioner Dow Jones & Co., Inc. On October 17, 1972, the Journal 
carried a front page article written by Gallese discussing the problems 
of implementing Massachusetts' anti-snob zoning law, 2 which was de-
signed to facilitate the construction of low income housing in subur-
ban communities where such construction is hindered by local zoning 
ordinances. A smaller, boxed-in article was included on the bottom of 
the same page and focused on the possibility that some dev~lopers 
might use the controversial law to "blackmail" town officials through-
out the state; if local approval for conventional development pro-
grams was not forthcoming, the developers could threaten to secure 
state approval to build low-income housing. This smaller article then 
quoted an accusation by an unnamed Stoneham, Massachusetts official 
that one developer, William D'Annolfo, was blackmailing Stoneham 
officials in this manner because they had refused his prior request for 
a permit to build luxury apartments. The official was also quoted as 
stating that D'Annolfo was a "bad word" in Stoneham. The article 
concluded with a paraphrase of a statement made by an unnamed 
22 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936), in which Justice Brandeis stated: 
The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its 
jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part 
of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are: ... 
3. The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is re-
quired by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." 
ld. at 346 (concurring opinion). 
23 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
§ 10.7. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1469,303 N.E.2d 847. 
2 G.L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23. 
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lawyer representing D'Annolfo which denied the charges made by the 
town official. On December 22, 1972, the Journal published a "correc-
tion" of its article, explaining that D'Annolfo had in fact applied for a 
permit to build a nursing and convalescent home and not for a zoning 
change to build luxury apartments. The Journal concluded that the 
inference of blackmail raised by the October article was incorrect and 
stated that it regretted the error.3 However, D'Annolfo complained 
that the correction was inadequate because it did not correct the town 
official's statement that D'Annolfo was a "bad word" in town.4 
D'Annolfo subsequently initiated a libel action in superior court 
against Gallese and Dow Jones early in 1973. On May 30, 1973, 
D'Annolfo's counsel took an oral deposition of Gallese, during which 
she refused to reveal the identity of the Stoneham official quoted in 
her story, claiming the information had been obtained under a pledge 
of confidentiality. 5 No other method of discovery had as yet been un-
dertaken by either party. D'Annolfo filed a motion in superior court 
for an order compelling Gallese to reveal her source. 6 The court 
granted the motion; the defendants then moved to quash the order. 
The motion to quash was continued without action while an inter-
locutory appeal was taken to the Supreme Judicial Court. 7 
On appeal the petitioners contended, in the words of the Court, 
that "the free press guaranty of the First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, while not creating an absolute privilege, at 
least creates a partial shield behind which journalists may conceal 
their confidential sources even from the fact-finding procedures 
3 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1470, 303 N.E.2d at 848. 
4 Brief for Respondent, William D'Annolfo at 3, Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 
1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1469, 303 N.E.2d 847. 
5 The oral deposition was taken pursuant to Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:15. Section l(a) 
of the rule states that a party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, 
"for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence or for both purposes." Section l(b) 
provides that "the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, 
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending proceeding .... " Section 
8(a) allows the person taking the deposition to request the court to grant a motion for 
an order compelling an answer. Section 8(b)(l) provides that "[i]f any party ... refuses 
to answer any question after being directed to do so by the court, the refusal may be 
considered a contempt of court." 
In proceedings in superior court, before a single justice of the Supreme Judicial 
Court, in Boston Housing Court and in certain proceedings in probate court and land 
court, this rule has been superseded by Mass. R. Civ. P. 26, effective July I, 1974. See 
note I 06 infra. 
6 Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:15 § 8(a). See note 5 supra. 
7 The appeal was taken under G.L. c. 211, § 4A, which reads in pertinent part: 
The supreme judicial court may also direct any cause or matter to be transferred 
from a lower court to it in whole or in part for further action or directions, and in 
case of partial transfer may issue such orders or directions in regard to the part of 
such cause or matter not so transferred as justice may require. 
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which are integral to the judicial process."8 They further contended 
that the shield must stand until it is demonstrated that the identity of 
the source is crucial to a particular judicial proceeding, 9 and that such 
a demonstration is made in a civil libel action only if the party seeking 
the information "has completed discovery, has exhausted alternative 
means of acquiring the desired information, and has demonstrated 
that he can and will succeed only if the identity of the anonymous 
[informant] is revealed." 10 The Court rejected both this three-pronged 
test and the constitutional argument supporting it, holding that in a 
civil libel suit where a reporter is a defendant, the First Amendment 
imports no privilege, qualified or absolute, to refuse to divulge the 
identity of a confidential source when requested to do so during dis-
covery. The lower court order compelling discovery was affirmed.U 
The Supreme Judicial Court relied on its 1971 decision In re 
Pappas, 12 which rejected, in the context of grand jury proceedings, an 
argument similar to that asserted by the Dow Jones defendants. The 
Pappas case was considered with two similar cases by the United States 
Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes 13 in 1972 and was affirmed. The 
Supreme Court in Branzburg concluded that the First Amendment 
does not provide any privilege-qualified or absolute-to refrain 
from divulging the identity of confidential news sources in response 
to legitimate grand jury questioning. 14 Three justices dissented, favor-
ing the adoption of a test similar to the one urged by petitioners in 
Dow Jones. 15 
8 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1471, 303 N.E.2d at 849. 
9 Id. at 1471-72, 303 N.E.2d at 849. 
10 I d. This test goes beyond the traditional judicial protection which is afforded a de-
ponent. See text at note I 05 infra. 
11 Id. at 852. 
12 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 
u.s. 665 ( 1972). 
13 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The companion cases to Pappas were Branz burg v. Pound, 
461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971) and Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 
1970). Branzburg was a prohibition proceeding by a newspaper reporter who had been 
held in contempt of court for refusing to reveal to a grand jury the identity of two 
hashish dealers about whom he had written an article. The Court held that a Kentucky 
statute protecting newsmen from revealing the identity of an informant from whom he 
had obtained information was not applicable to events which the newsman had person-
ally observed. Such events included the identity of the hashish dealers. Caldwell 
concerned efforts by a federal grand jury to compel a reporter to appear before it and 
bring with him notes and tape recordings of interviews given him for publication by 
members of the Black Panther Party regarding its aims, purposes and activities. The 
Court held that, absent some special showing of necessity, the reporter did not have to 
appear or testify before the grand jury. 
14 408 U.S. at 667. 
15 Id. at 743. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented. The 
dissenters would compel disclosure to a grand jury if (I) there is probable cause to be-
lieve that the newsman has information clearly relevant to a specific probable violation 
of law; (2) the information cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of 
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This note will examine first the possible sources of a newsman 
privilege not to reveal confidential news sources. It will explore the 
development of judicial attitudes toward the existence of a constitu-
tional privilege, focusing on the proposition that newsgathering is an 
implied right under the First Amendment. Finally, this note will con-
clude with an examination of the contention that the legislature is the 
best and, at least in Massachusetts, the only forum for properly weigh-
ing the competing interests involved in the newsman privilege ques-
tion. 
Although there are three potential sources of a newsman testimo-
nial privilege-statutory, common law, and constitutional, only the last 
provides a basis in Massachusetts. Neither Congress nor the Mas-
sachusetts General Court has created any statutory scheme to protect 
newsmen against forced disclosure of confidential sources under any 
circumstances.16 The general common law is likewise unavailing. 
Courts have consistently refused to recognize a common law testimo-
nial privilege for newsmen 17 on the grounds that every citizen has a 
duty to testify in order to assure the fair administration of justice.18 
However, this duty to testify is not absolute. Exceptions have been 
created when there is found to be "a public good transcending the 
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for as-
certaining truth."19 In order to justify breaching this duty to testify by 
finding that certain communications are privileged,20 the common law 
has required that four conditions be met: that (1) the communications 
originate in a confidence; (2) the element of confidentiality be essen-
tial to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between 
the parties; (3) the relation be one which, in the opinion of the com-
munity, ought to be fostered; and (4) the injury that would inure to 
the relation by the disclosure of the communications be greater than 
First Amendment rights; and (3) there is a compelling and overriding interest in the in-
formation. Id. at 743. Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissent on only the Caldwell case. 
Id. at 711. 
16 At the time of the Branzburg decision, 17 states had passed "shield" laws which 
provide some evidentiary protection for newsmen to refuse to reveal confidential news 
sources. 408 U.S. at 689 n.27. Eight states have passed such statutes since Branzburg. 
Recent Decisions, 9 U. Richmond L. Rev. 171, 175 n.26 (1974). 
17 E.g., Brewster v. Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957) (interpret-
ing Mass. law). See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966). 
18 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter 
cited as Wigmore]. 
19 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), dis-
cussing the admissibility of evidence obtained by state officers during a search which 
would have violated the Fourth Amendment if conducted by federal officers. 
20 Wigmore, supra note 18; lists four types of confidential communications which 
were privileged at common law: attorney-client, husband-wife, informer-government, 
and those between jurors. ld. § 2285, at 528. In addition to common law privileges, the 
Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself .... " U.S. Const. amend. V. 
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the benefit thereby gained for the proper disposal of litigation. 21 
Courts applying the common law have remained unconvinced that the 
last three conditions are present in the relationship between a news-
man and his source. 22 However, it should be noted that the develop-
ment of the common law re~arding evidentiary privileges essentially 
stopped nearly a century ago. 3 
In the absence of statutory or common law protection, a constitu-
tional argument must be made where a newsman privilege is sought. 
The principal argument of opponents of a newsman privilege is that 
journalists should not be exempt from the application of laws and 
procedural rules in general,24 such as the duty to testify. In light of 
the judicial protection given to other confidential relationships, it is 
submitted that this contention should not be persuasive since it fails to 
acknowledge the dual role which a newsman must play. As a private 
citizen, the journalist is subject to the same duties and obligations as 
all citizens, including the duty to testify. However, as a newsgatherer 
he serves the public interest in the dissemination of news. It is submit-
ted that because newsgathering and dissemination are First Amend-
ment interests,25 a balancing test must be used to determine whether 
they should prevail. 26 The essence of the constitutional argument for 
a newsman privilege is thus that a newsman can fulfill his public func-
tion as a newsgatherer only by being permitted to breach his personal 
civic duty to testify_27 
In Dow Jones, the Supreme Judicial Court took the position that 
even this constitutional argument was precluded by its earlier decision 
21 Wigmore, supra note 18, § 2285, at 527. 
22 See Annot., 7 A.L.R. 3d 591, 592-96 (1966) and Wigmore, supra note 18, § 2286, 
at 528, 529-30 n.9, § 2286, at 62-63 (Supp. 1972). 
23 McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 77, at 156 (2d ed. E. Cleary 
1972). There have been some exceptions. See id. at 156 n.32. 
24 Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937). The Court held that the 
Associated Press was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act and Article I,§ 8 of the U.S. Constitution and thus regulable 
by Congress. Id. at 128. 
25 See text at notes 57-66 infra. 
26 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). See also 
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (municipal ordinance prohibiting house-to-
house canvassing void as applied to one who canvassed in the name of religion since 
city's interest in keeping streets clean from discarded circular does not override free-
dom of speech); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (municipal ordinance forbid-
ding persons from knocking on doors for purpose of distributing handbills was an in-
valid abridgement of freedom of speech and press); Democratic Nat'! Comm. v. 
McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (newsman has at least a qualified privilege 
under the First Amendment not to disclose information where there has been no show-
ing that information goes to the heart of the case and alternative sources have been ex-
hausted). See note 44 infra. 
27 See Note, Beyond Branzburg: The Continuing Quest for Reporter's Privilege, 24 
Syracuse L. Rev. 731, 734 (1973). 
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in Pappas. 28 Paul Pappas was a television reporter-photographer who 
had been assigned to cover civil disturbances in New Bedford and had 
been admitted to the local Black Panthers' barricaded headquarters 
for a press conference. The Panthers later allowed him to re-enter 
their headquarters on the condition that he report only news about an 
anticipated police raid. The raid never materialized, however, and ac-
cordingly Pappas reported nothing. A grand jury was subsequently 
convened to identify and indict those responsible for criminal acts 
during the civil disturbances, and Pappas was subpoenaed to appear 
before it. When asked about events and persons inside the Panther 
headquarters, Pappas refused to answer on the ground that the First 
Amendment afforded him a privilege as a newsman to protect the 
sources of information acquired in confidence.29 The Supreme Judi-
cial Court rejected Pappas' claim and held that "there exists no con-
stitutional newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute, to refuse 
to appear and testify before a court or grandjury."30 
The Pappas case centered around the issue of the obligation of a 
news reporter to reveal information to a grand jury deemed relevant 
to the commission of a crime. The attitudes of the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Pappas and the United States Supreme Court in affirming 
Pappas in Branzburg regarding a newsman privilege were intertwined 
with the judicial perception of the grand jury's role as the investiga-
tive arm of the criminal justice systemY Although both cases held 
that the First Amendment does not provide protection for the news-
man when such protection would undermine the function of the 
grand jury, 32 neither case explicitly denied the existence of a First 
Amendment privilege in other legal proceedings in which it might be 
asserted. 33 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Dow Jones expressly recognized this 
limited scope of Branzburg34 and justified its reliance on Pappas by 
carefully drawing distinctions between its decision in Pappas and the 
Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg. The Branzburg decision had 
emphasized that the sole issue before the Court was "the obligation of 
reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas . . . ."35 The Court in 
Dow jones asserted that Pappas was not so restricted since it stressed 
28 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1472, 303 N.E.2d at 849. 
29 358 Mass. 604, 605, 266 N.E.2d 297, 298 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
30 358 Mass. at 612, 266 N.E.2d at 302-03. 
31 "The prevailing constitutional view of the newsman's privilege is very much rooted 
in the ancient role of the grand jury .... " 408 U.S. at 686. 
32 358 Mass. at 613-14, 266 N.E.2d at 303-04; 408 U.S. at 690-91. 
33 See Significant Developm!!nts, 53 B.U.L. Rev. 497, 505-06 (1973) (the Branzburg 
decision is not limited to the grand jury context). 
34 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1472, 303 N.E.2d at 849. 
35 408 U.S. at 682. 
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the importance of disclosure to the judicial process generally rather 
than to the criminal process alone, as Branzburg had done. 36 However, 
it is submitted that this distinction between Pappas and Branzburg is an 
artificial one. While it is true that Pappas contains general language 
about the duty of a newsman to testify before a court as well as a 
grand jury,37 such language was dicta insofar as it went beyond the 
question of privilege in grand jury proceedings.38 To accept such a 
distinction between Pappas and Branzburg would undermine the Su-
preme Court's rationale for limiting its holding in Branzburg. The Su-
preme Court properly reserved for itself the opportunity to explore 
fully, at the proper time,39 the different societal interests involved in a 
civil action and how the weight given these particular interests might 
be affected by the First Amendment concerns expressed in numerous 
Supreme Court decisions. 40 
It is submitted that determination of the constitutional privilege 
question in civil actions should turn on a balancing of the interests in-
volved in a particular case and not on a blanket rule. Justice Powell's 
concurring opinion in Branzburg41 emphasized the need to examine 
the privilege question on a case-by-case basis. 
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by 
the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press 
and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony . . . . 
The balance between these vital constitutional and societal in-
terests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and tradi-
tional way of adjudicating such questions. 42 
36 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1472, 303 N.E.2d at 849. 
37 358 Mass. at 612, 266 N.E.2d at 302-03. See text at note 30 supra. 
38 The Pappas court concluded that it could 
do no more than to state (1) that a grand jury, to carry out its ancient and impor-
tant public function, must be allowed appropriate scope of investigation; (2) that it 
is the duty of all citizens ... to assist in such inquiries ... ; (3) that the burden rests 
upon a witness, ... to establish that the grand jury inquiry is improper or oppres-
sive; and (4) ... the presiding judge ... may take into account all pertinent cir-
cumstances affecting the propriety, purposes, and scope of the grand jury inquiry 
and the pertinence of the probable testimony of the particular witness to the inves-
tigation in progress. 
358 Mass. at 613-14, 266 N.E.2d at 303-04. 
39 The U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2 only applies to "cases" and "controversies." Thus the 
Court can only rule on the actual issue before it. Unlike the federal constitution, the 
Massachusetts Constitution provides for advisory opinions by the Supreme Judicial 
Court: "Each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor and council, shall have 
authority to require the opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court, upon im-
portant questions of law, and upon solemn occasions." Mass. Const. pt. 2, c. 3, art. II. 
40 See 408 U.S. at 680 n.17. 
41 408 U.S. at 709-10. Since Branzburg was a 5-4 decision, Justice Powell's vote was 
crucial. See Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare 
Decisis, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 99 (1957) for a discussion of the debate on the precedential 
value of a plurality opinion such as Branzburg. 
42 408 U.S. at 710. 
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The outcome of such a balancing test might necessarily be different in 
the civil context than in the grand jury context because different 
societal interests are at stake. 43 Several post-Branzburg federal civil 
cases have recognized this. Some of these decisions, although factually 
distinguishable from Dow Jones, have refused to compel disclosure.44 
In Carey v. Hume, 45 a post-Branzburg libel action, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged 
that neither the language nor the holding in Branzburg precluded the 
establishment of at least a qualified privilege for newsmen to refuse to 
reveal confidential sources in civil litigation.46 The Carey case arose 
out of a news story which charged that the plaintiff, who was general 
counsel to the United Mine Workers, had helped to secretly remove 
documents from the union's headquarters during a federal investiga-
tion of its financial affairs. In a subsequent libel action, the plaintiff 
sought the identity of the news reporter's sources who were allegedly 
eyewitnesses to the plaintiff's crime. Noting that the information went 
to the heart of the plaintiff's claim and that exhausting all other 
means of obtaining the desired information was impossible, the court 
concluded that the establishment of an absolute privilege to refuse dis-
closure of the identities of confidential sources of information would 
not prevailY Since it appears that the Supreme Judicial Court re-
jected the balancing approach when it adopted a uniform application 
of the Pappas reasoning to all situations, it is submitted that Dow Jones 
thus wrongly precludes the establishment of a constitutional newsman 
privilege in those civil cases where it would be merited. 
Judicial attitudes toward the conflict between the press' interest in 
nondisclosure and the civil litigants' "right to everyman's evidence"48 
have undergone considerable transformation since 1958 when the 
first constitutional claim for a newsman privilege was asserted in 
Garland v. Torre. 49 In Garland, a newspaper columnist for the New 
York Herald Tribune, Marie Torre, published an article containing 
defamatory remarks about actress Judy Garland which were attributed 
43 See discussion in text at notes 93-100 infra. 
44 E.g., Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972). See text at notes 
70-72 infra; Democratic Nat'! Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (mo-
tion to quash subpoenas granted in attempt by defendants in civil action arising out of 
the break-in at the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee to obtain 
the identity of sources of related newspaper articles); note 26 supra. 
45 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974). 
46 "[l]t appears to us that Branzhurg, in language if not in holding, left intact, insofar 
as civil litigation is concerned, the approach taken in [Garland v. Torre]." ld. at 636. 
See text at notes 49-52 infra for a summary of Garland and see text at notes 103-11 
infra for a comparison of the Garland approach with the three-pronged test advocated 
by the defendants in Dow joneJ. 
47 Id. at 639. 
48 Wigmore, supra note 18, § 2192, at 70. 
49 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). 
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to an unnamed Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) executive. In a 
suit by Garland against CBS for breach of contract and defamation, 
Garland's counsel deposed the columnist50 in an effort to identify the 
source of the statement. Torre refused to reveal it and was held in 
criminal contempt. 51 In an opinion written by Judge (now Justice) 
Stewart, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling compel-
ling disclosure. 52 The Supreme Judicial Court in Dow Jones simply 
acknowledged the existence of Garland; it did not examine the Garland 
holding, 53 but relied instead on its own decision in Pappas. However, 
an analysis of Garland sheds some light on the decisional criteria 
which Dow Jones should have used. 
In Garland, the court weighed the private interests of the reporter 
in nondisclosure against the "paramount public interest in the fair 
administration of justice."54 The Garland court concluded that even if 
there was a First Amendment privilege, it was not absolute55 and was 
outweighed by the public interest in compelled testimony. It is submit-
ted that the court reached this conclusion for two reasons: first, the 
court was unsure of the degree to which prior case law had extended 
First Amendment protection to newsgathering, and second, the court 
overestimated the weight which should be attributed to the societal in-
terest in compelled testimony. 56 Scrutiny of the case law since Garland 
will demonstrate that the premises upon which the holding in Garland 
was based have been called into question so frequently since they were 
first articulated that they can no longer be accepted uncritically. 
Garland had only hypothesized that newsgathering might be deserv-
ing of First Amendment protection.57 However, several commentators 
have not been so meek and have asserted that freedom of the press 
necessarily implies freedom to gather news. 58 The framers of the Bill 
of Rights themselves acknowledged the need for such protection. 5 9 AI-
50 Torre, unlike Gallese in Dow Jones, was not a party to the action. 
5
' 259 F.2d at 547. 
52 Id. at 55l. 
53 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1476, 303 N.E.2d at 852. 
54 259 F.2d at 549. 
55 Id. at 548. 
56 "If an additional First Amendment liberty-the freedom of the press-is here in-
volved, we do not hesitate to conclude that it too must give place under the Constitu-
tion to a paramount public interest in the fair administration of justice." Id. at 549. 
57 Id. at 548. 
58 Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their 
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 18 (1969); Comment, The Rights of the Public and the Press 
to Gather Information, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1505 (1974); Comment, 58 Iowa L. Rev. 618 
(1973); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 838 
(1971 ); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential 
Relationship, 80 Yale L.J. 317 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note]. 
59 6 Writings of James Madison 398 (Hunt ed. 1906). "A popular government with-
out popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or 
tragedy or perhaps both." 
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though the United States Supreme Court has not decided this precise 
issue, there is strong support in various decisions to indicate that the 
Court has recognized that the right to gather news is implicit in the 
First Amendment. 
The Supreme Court has established several corollary rights which 
are essential to freedom of the press, 60 including the rights to publish 
without prior restraint, 61 to circulate publications, 62 to distribute liter-
ature freely, 63 and to receive information without discriminatory state 
restrictions. 64 It was argued in dissent in Branzburg that just as the 
guarantee of a free press is meaningless without the right to publish 
and distribute, the right to publish and distribute is worthless without 
some guarantee of the right to gather information. 65 The Court's oft-
repeated support of a free press could thus be read as impliedly sup-
porting that which is essential to the existence of a press in the first 
instance, i.e., the right to gather information. The m~ority in 
Branzburg itself gives credence to this interpretation of First Amend-
ment case law, albeit in dicta: "We do not question the significance of 
free speech, press, or assembly to the country's welfare. Nor is it sug-
gested that newsgathering does not qualify for First Amendment pro-
tection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of 
the press could be eviscerated."66 Once newsgathering is established as 
60 Yale Note, supra note 58, at 327. 
61 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,713 (1931). 
62 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1936). 
63 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1946); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 
149 (1943). 
64 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,307 (1965). 
65 "A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news .... [W]ithout 
freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be impermissibly com-
promised." 408 U.S. at 727-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall 
joined in this dissent. 
66 408 U.S. at 681. Some of the cases cited by the Court as the justification for limit-
ing the protection afforded newsgathering may be distinguished from the situation in 
Dow jones. In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), cited in 408 U.S. at 684, the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of a ban on travel to Cuba by a private individual 
even though that restriction "render[ed] less than wholly free the flow of information 
concerning that country." 381 U.S. at 16. The basis of that decision was that "(t]he right 
to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." 
Id. at 17 (emphasis added). The inference made, however, is that there is at least some 
right to gather news. Zemel can easily be distinguished from the newsmen cases since 
the potential newsgatherer was a private individual who sought to learn about Cuba for 
personal intellectual enrichment. Such a distinction points out the problem of determin-
ing who should be able to claim the right to a newsman privilege. This issue seemed to 
bother Justice White in the plurality opinion in Branzburg as well. 408 U.S. at 704. In 
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), and in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), 
cited in 408 U.S. at 685, the Supreme Court also recognized the need to exercise some 
control over press newsgathering. In each of these cases, however, a criminal 
defendant's right to a fair trial was at stake. Press conduct was disruptive and excessive 
in both cases. Therefore, neither decision denies general constitutional protection for 
newsgathering. 
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an interest which should be afforded protection by the First Amend-
ment, the extent to which that interest is invaded by forcing disclosure 
of a newsman's confidential sources must be determined. Both 
Pappas61 and Branzburg68 questioned whether such forced disclosure to 
the grand jury would result in the diminution of the flow of news to 
the public. Dow Jones adopts a similarly skeptical view when the forced 
disclosure occurs during civil litigation. 
However, other courts which have confronted this issue in the civil 
context arrived at a somewhat different conclusion. 5 9 In Baker v. F & 
F Investment, 70 the Second Circuit forswore any uncertainty about the 
detrimental impact forced disclosure would have on the news flow in 
the civil context. Baker, unlike Garland and Dow Jones, was not a civil 
libel action. It involved the efforts of plaintiffs in a civil rights action 
alleging racial discrimination in sale of housing to compel a journalist 
to disclose the confidential source of his article on "blockbusting." The 
journalist had written the article ten years prior to the suit and he was 
not a party to the action. While the Garland court acknowledged that 
"compulsory disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources of infor-
mation may entail an abridgement of press freedom by imposing 
some limitation upon the availability of news,"71 Baker forcefully con-
cluded that "[c]ompelled disclosure of confidential sources unques-
tionably threatens a journalist's ability to secure information that is 
made available to him only on a confidential basis [This] 
threatens freedom of the press and the public's need to be 
informed." 72 
Pappas and Branzburg cite the lack of any positive empirical proof 
that forced disclosure has a detrimental impact on news dissemination 
as a reason for their reluctance to conclude as a matter of law that 
such disclosure results in an impermissible invasion of a First 
Amendment interest. 73 These decisions would have been more accu-
rate, however, if they had stated that there exists data showing such a 
detrimental impact but that they remained unpersuaded by the con-
clusions of such data. 
The most comprehensive statistical study was conducted by Profes-
sor Vincent Blasi of the University of Michigan Law School with the 
assistance of Dean Richard Baker of the Columbia Graduate School of 
Journalism. 74 This study was comprised of three separate but in terre-
67 358 Mass. at 612, 266 N.E.2d at 302. 
68 408 U.S. at 698-99. 
69 See cases cited in notes 44-45 supra. 
70 4 70 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972). Since Branzburg, this case is perhaps the authority 
most frequently cited by proponents of a newsman privilege. 
71 259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958) (emphasis added). 
72 470 F.2d at 782. 
73 358 Mass. at 612, 266 N.E.2d at 302; 408 U.S. at 693-94. 
74 Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 229 (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as Blasi]. 
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lated surveys of individual newsmen. In the first survey, Blasi person-
ally interviewed forty-seven reporters and editors from large cities75 
who were "chosen impressionistically on the basis of their expressed 
willingness to cooperate, their achievements in the profession, the 
kind of reporting or editing they do, their importance in terms of the 
number of readers or viewers they reach, and their familiarity with 
the subpoena problem."76 In the second study, Blasi and Baker 
mailed questionnaires to sixty-seven reporters whom they considered 
to be familiar with the subpoena problem. 77 Since the statistical popu-
lation was preselected, "[t]he questionnaire was designed to obtain 
'qualitative' rather than 'quantitative' information."78 The third survey 
was intended to solicit quantitative information. The population in-
volved was nonrandom 79 as it was designed to include primarily re-
porters from a wide range of media who reach a relatively large 
number of readers, viewers, or listeners. 80 
Blasi concluded from the quantitative survey that the average 
newsman in the population surveyed relies on "regular" confidential 
sources in approximately 22.2% of his stories and on first-time confi-
dential sources in 12.2%.81 Many of the reporters interviewed, how-
75 These cities were New York, Washington, D.C., Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, and Denver. 
76 Blasi, supra note 74, at 236. 
77 Such familiarity was judged either on the basis of the personal knowledge of the 
surveyors or the type of reporting done. Id. Reporters covering the polarized elements 
of society, such as minorities, political radicals, and criminals, are most likely to have a 
familiarity with the subpoena problem since they tend to be more dependent upon con-
fidential sources than other reporters. This is the result of the reluctance of such 
groups to give any information unless they are convinced the reporter is "on their side" 
and will assure their anonymity. ld. at 241. 
78 Id. at 236. 
79 Blasi had two reasons for choosing a nonrandom population. First, not all kinds of 
reporters are likely to have a familiarity with the subpoena problem. See note 77 supra. 
Second, there is a statistical definitional problem in determining who should be labeled 
as a 'journalist." In a society which treasures the right of self-expression, anyone who 
picks up the pen may fashion himself a 'journalist." Blasi therefore limited his sample 
to newsmen for whom journalism was a full time profession. Blasi, supra note 74, at 
236-37. 
80 Id. A total of 1,470 questionnaires were sent out, of which 975 (66.3%) were re-
turned to the surveyors. ld. at 238. The value of a quantitative survey is limited since 
(1) it limits the subject in the types of responses he may make; (2) the population sur-
veyed could be considered incurably biased from the outset since some kind of privilege 
to refuse to divulge confidential sources would likely be viewed by most journalists as 
necessary and beneficial to the profession as a whole; (3) despite an attempt to create a 
large survey population, the respondents were part of at least a limited selective process 
as a result of either the surveyors' own conscious efforts or the self-selection of those 
who chose to return the completed questionnaires; and (4) the study was made from 
the responses of newsmen and not from the responses of those who have been confi-
dential sources. ld. at 239. 
81 Id. at 247. 
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ever, stated that their most important stories tend to come from first-
time sources. 82 
In an earlier study, James Guest and Alan Stanzler83 surveyed the 
editors of leading newspapers to determine the percentage of stories 
which were based on confidential sources.84 The percentage results 
indicating the importance of confidential sources to news stories were 
generally higher in this study than in the Blasi survey.85 This differ-
ence may be explained by the less refined and more informal nature 
of the research method used by Guest and Stanzler. 86 
In determining what percentage of the stories would be affected by 
the threat of forced disclosure of the identity of a confidential source 
for the story, Blasi found that about 8% of the respondents to this 
question87 reported that their coverage of a particular story within the 
past eighteen months had been adversely affected by the possibility of 
such a subpoena.88 It is extremely difficult to assess the qualitative 
value of this finding since the statistics give no indication of the rela-
tive importance of those stories adversely affected. 89 
It is submitted that the conclusions drawn from the data from 
either the Blasi or Guest and Stanzler studies might differ depending 
82 Id. In response to the question "Have you ever been served with a subpoena in 
conjunction with your reporting?," 180 (18.5%) of the journalists said "yes," 689 
(70.7%) said "no," and 106 (10.9%) did not answer. Id at 260. 
83 Both Guest and Stanzler are members of the Massachusetts Bar. 
84 Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their 
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 18 (1969). 
85 For example, the Christian Science Monitor reported that 33-50% of its stories in-
volved confidential sources. ld. at 43-44. The San Francisco Chronicle stated that "(a]n 
absolutely staggering number of stories, political and non-political, arise from informa-
tion received in confidence." Id. at 60. The Wall Street Journal, however, reported that 
15% of its articles were based on confidential information. ld. at 43. This Wall Street 
Journal figure is less than the figure cited by Blasi for the percentage of stories which 
regularly rely on confidential sources. It is, however, greater than the Blasi study figure 
for stories based on first-time confidential sources. 
86 The Guest and Stanzler study asked only one question: that of what number of 
stories were based on confidential sources. Additional comments could be made by the 
editor being surveyed. Id. at 57. 
87 Only 887 out of the total 975 respondents answered this particular question. Blasi, 
supra note 74, at 270. 
88 Ninety-seven (10.9%) said they were not certain whether the possibility of sub-
poena had had an adverse effect and 719 (81.1%) said the subpoena possibility had not 
affected their coverage of any story. Id. This question was not asked in the Guest and 
Stanzler study. 
89 Perhaps the most well-known but most overworked illustration of this problem is 
the journalistic exposure of the Watergate-related scandals. Confidential sources were 
used by a number of investigative reporters, most notably Robert Woodward and Carl 
Bernstein of the Washington Post. See R. Woodward and C. Bernstein, All the 
President's Men (1974). Stories of the proportions of the Watergate scandals might very 
well be part of the 8% of the stories which Blasi found to be adversely affected by the 
threat of forced disclosure. The 8% figure might therefore be mistakenly viewed as rel-
atively inconsequential. 
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upon a particular court's predisposition to the value which should be 
attributed to press interests. Whether the interference with those in-
terests as evidenced by these statistical studies is found to be de 
minimis or quite harmful and therefore unconstitutional will there-
fore vary according to the subjective perception of the court. Thus 
these statistics may be more reinforcements of pre-existing judicial be-
liefs than weapons of persuasion. Accordingly, advocates of either 
position-pro or anti-privilege-could find some statistical foundation 
to support their position. 
It should also be noted that both the Blasi and Guest and Stanzler 
studies were conducted before the Branzburg decision. Perhaps the 
impact of that decision and the publicity surrounding it will increase 
any detrimental effect which forced disclosure will have on the 
newsman-source relationship. 
If one accepts the premise that newsgathering and dissemination of 
news are protected by the First Amendment, 90 then any direct or in-
direct abridgement of these rights through the forced disclosure of 
confidential news sources can be justified only by a compelling state 
interest. 91 Pappas and Branzburg declared that such a paramount in-
terest is to be found in the enforcement of the criminal justice 
system.92 However, the Supreme Court, in the context of executive 
privilege, has pointed out that the set of competing interests that is at 
stake in criminal proceedings is different from the set involved in civil 
proceedings, although the Court did not indicate the exact parameters 
of that difference.93 The state interest in the criminal justice system is 
in obtaining information that may aid in the apprehension and con-
viction of criminals as well as in protecting a criminal defendant's con-
stitutional right of due process.94 In a civil proceeding, however, al-
though nondisclosure of information may be detrimental to litigants, 
their right to compel testimony lacks explicit constitutional stature, un-
like the protection afforded criminal defendants by the Fifth,95 
90 See text at notes 57-66 supra. 
91 E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,439 (1963). 
92 358 Mass. at 612-13, 266 N.E.2d at 302-03; 408 U.S. at 686-98. 
93 "We are not here concerned with the balance between the President's generalized 
interest in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in civil litigation .... We 
address only the conflict between the President's assertion of a generalized privilege of 
confidentiality against the constitutional need for relevant evidence to criminal trials." 
United States v. Nixon,-U.S.-, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3109 n.19 (1974). Cf. Carey v. Hume, 
492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974). 
94 Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 Texas L. Rev. 
831, 899 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Murasky]. 
95 U.S. Const. amend. V, quoted in note 20 supra. 
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Sixth,96 and Fourteenth97 Amendments. The primary interest of the 
state in civil litigation is in providing a forum for the peaceful settle-
ment of noncriminal disputes between private individuals. The state 
has no interest in a particular plaintiff or defendant prevailing. Pro-
tecting a plaintiff from an adverse civil judgment is not as compelling 
as protecting society from the criminal element and affording a crim-
inal defendant the opportunity and the means to prove his 
innocence. 98 
The plaintiff in a civil suit does not have a constitutional basis for 
thwarting the establishment of a newsman privilege.99 Rather, it is the 
press and its readers which have the constitutional interest at stake. 
Since the guarantees of the First Amendment are not absolute/ 00 a 
court must consider and weigh countervailing interests, such as that of 
protecting one's reputation, as in Dow Jones, in determining the 
proper limits of the privilege. The three-pronged test for disclosure 
advanced by the defendants in Dow Jones 101 acknowledges this need. It 
is submitted that the thrust of this test is not significantly different 
from that imposed by the court in Garland. Although Garland did not 
recognize a constitutional newsman privilege, it noted that First 
Amendment interests might be involved 102 and therefore was reluc-
tant to compel disclosure without establishing some preliminary 
guidelines. Thus, the court stated that disclosure was justified only 
when the plaintiff had taken active and independent steps to deter-
mine the identity of the sou:rce103 and when the identity of that source 
went "to the heart of" the plaintiff's claim.104 It is submitted that even 
under the Garland standard, the Supreme Judicial Court should have 
postponed compelling disclosure since there had not yet been any 
showing in the record that the plaintiff had taken any independent 
action to find out the identity of the Stoneham official. 
The standard asserted by the defendants in Dow Jones is somewhat 
more stringent than the Garland standard since it would require that 
96 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to speedy and public 
trial ... ; to be confronted with the Witnesses against him; have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor .... " U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
97 "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. Const. amend. XIV,§ I. 
98 See Murasky, supra note 94, at 899. 
99 One commentator has singled out Massachusetts as an exception to the general 
rule that the First Amendment protects the right of a journalist to refuse to disclose his 
informants' identity in a libel action under some circumstances. Murasky, supra note 94, 
at 911-12. 
100 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
101 See text at note 10 supra. 
102 259 F.2d at 548. 
103 Id. at 551. 
104 Id. at 550. 
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discovery be otherwise completed and that all other means of ascer-
taining the identity of the source be exhausted. The Court in Dow 
Jones rejected the suggestion that a distinction be drawn between pre-
trial discovery proceedings and the trial itself for the purpose of the 
disclosure issue on the grounds that judicial rules provide sufficient 
protection for any deponent, including the newsman, from "an-
noyance, undue expense, embarrassment, or oppression."105 This con-
clusion, it is submitted, begs the question since it does not address it-
self to. the differences in purpose of pre-trial discovery and the trial 
itself. Liberal civil discovery rules permit litigants to obtain relevant 
information106 which may never be used at trial.1°7 The possibility of 
feigned suits initiated merely to obtain the identity of a source could 
be minimized, if not eliminated, by postponing disclosure until the 
trial proceedings. Further, during discovery, the civil litigant's interest 
in a favorable outcome is not yet directly at stake. 108 There is conse-
quently no justification for infringing upon the defendant's First 
Amendment interests at this stage in the proceedings. Recent federal 
civil cases have not required that all other means of ascertaining the 
source's identity be exhausted before compelling disclosure. 109 It is 
submitted, however, that such a prerequisite provides a stronger 
105 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1469, 1473 n.4, 303 N.E.2d 847, 849 n.4, quoting Mass. Sup. 
Jud. Ct. R. 3:15 § 4(b). 
106 Compare Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:15, quoted in part at note 5 supra, with Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26, which provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Discovery Methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the follow-
ing methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written in-
terrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land 
or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental exami-
nations; and requests for admission. Unless the court orders otherwise under sub-
division (c) of this rule, the frequency of use of these methods is not limited. 
(b) Scope of Discovery .... (1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding 
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking dis-
covery or to the claim or defense of any other party .... It is not ground for ob-
jection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the informa-
tion sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence .... 
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom dis-
covery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court ... may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrass-
ment, oppression, or undue burden or expense .... 
See new Mass. R. Civ. P. 26, implemented on July 1, 1974, which is substantially the 
same as Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. 
107 Murasky, supra note 94, at 899. 
1os Id. 
109 In Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 638-39 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 
417 U.S. 938 (1974), the court stated that the facts of the case placed an impossible 
burden upon the plaintiff to investigate all other means of obtaining the identity of the 
source and therefore did not require it. Id. at 638-39. See text at notes 45-46 supra. 
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safeguard against impairment of important First Amendment in-
terests. 
Determining whether the identity of the source goes "to the heart" 
of the plaintiff's claim is difficult since the Garland court never articu-
lated what criteria are to be used to ascertain whether information is 
crucial to the case. The standard suggested by the defendants in Dow 
Jones is more easily applied then the Garland "heart of the matter" 
standard since it specifically states the criteria to be used to determine 
the necessity of the information sought. The plaintiff must demon-
strate that he can and will succeed if and only if he has knowledge of 
the source's identity.U° Consequently a court should not require dis-
closure if the plaintiffs claim is frivolous and without merit or if there 
is some alternative means for the plaintiff to prevail. 111 Under the 
Garland test, the existence of alternatives to compelled disclosure 
available to allow the plaintiff to maintain and prevail in his action 
was not relevant. However, it is submitted that the use of any and all 
alternatives to forced disclosure is desirable since it would also reduce 
those instances where First Amendment interests may be abridged. 
The need for establishing prerequisites to forced disclosure with 
great specificity so as to minimize the infringement of the press' con-
stitutional interests is perhaps best appreciated by considering the 
landmark Supreme Court decision New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 112 
New York Times and its progeny113 brought certain defamatory re-
marks about public officials and figures within the aegis of the First 
110 See text at note 10 supra. 
111 Federal courts have made preliminary investigations into the merits of particular 
cases by the use of summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), which provides in 
pertinent part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not 
so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Summary judgment in the Massachusetts courts was available only in contract actions at 
the time Dow Jones was decided. G.L. c. 231, §§ 59, 59B (1956). The Supreme Judicial 
Court was therefore justified in rejecting as precedent Cervantes v. Time, 464 F.2d 986 
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), since that case turned on the issue 
of the appropriateness of summary judgment. 464 F.2d at 994-95. The new Mas-
sachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which were implemented on July 1, 1974, provide 
for summary judgment in all actions. The text of Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(e) is the same as 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). For a discussion of the problem of the various burdens of proof 
which might be required for summary judgment in a libel action involving constitu-
tional issues, see Comment, 58 Iowa L. Rev. 618, 629-37 (1973). 
112 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
113 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) extended New York Times to in-
clude public figures as well as public officials. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 
U.S. 29 (1971) further extended New York Times to matters of public concern. Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 326 (1974), however, retracted the Rosenbloom exten-
sion. See text at notes 123-27 infra. 
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Amendment. The Court assured such protection by forcing public of-
ficial plaintiffs in libel suits to demonstrate "with convincing clarity" 
that the newspaper showed actual malice or reckless disregard of the 
truth.ll 4 This decision is indicative of the Supreme Court's intention 
to fashion specific and burdensome standards of proof which will 
usually prevent plaintiffs from prevailing in libel actions when the ab-
sence of such standards would have a chilling effect on the freedom 
of the press.U 5 Although New York Times did not involve a question of 
privilege, it did acknowledge the great weight which should generally 
be attributed to First Amendment interests in civil litigation.U 6 New 
York Times was decided after Garland and consequently the need for a 
standard which would limit the detrimental impact on First Amend-
ment interests in civil litigation may not have been as obvious to the 
Garland court as it is today. Since neither Pappas nor Branzburg were 
civil libel suits, they did not invoke the policies underlying New York 
Times 117 but focused instead upon the problems peculiar to grand jury 
proceedings. 118 
The Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that "the standards of 
the New York Times case may be applicable to [Dow Jones]." 119 It main-
tained, however, that such standards were not relevant to its decision 
on the discovery-disclosure issue. 120 The Court stated that the identity 
of the source was relevant and that "the order compelling discovery 
must be obeyed regardless of the standard of proof which will even-
tually be required in this case."121 If the Court had accepted the stan-
dards for disclosure advocated by the defendants, some consideration 
of the plaintiff's burden of proof would have been necessary. Further, 
if the Court had determined that the burden of proof required by 
New York Times did not apply and that the defendant was therefore 
forced to prove truth, it is much less likely that the identity of the 
source would have been crucial to the plaintiff's case. If, on the other 
hand, the Court decided that the New York Times burden of proof was 
applicable, it is probable that the source's identity would have been es-
sential to the plaintiff's case. In order for the plaintiff to discharge his 
onerous burden of proof under New York Times, he would have to 
show that the newspaper's source was unreliable and that the news-
paper failed to adhere to the "standards of good !nvestigation and 
114 376 U.S. at 285-86. 
115 Id. at 279. 
116 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967). 
117 For an excellent discussion of the policies underlying New York Times, see T. 
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 517-43 (1970). 
118 Comment, 58 Iowa L. Rev. 618, 628 (1973). 
119 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1475 n.6, 303 N.E.2d at 851 n.6. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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reporting"122 in order to verify the informant's story. Without access 
to the identity of the source, it is unlikely that the plaintiff saddled 
with such a burden of proof could prevail. 
If the Supreme Judicial Court had found that the New York Times 
burden of proof was applicable, and it is probable that it would, it 
would have done so on the basis of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, /nc. 123 
Rosenbloom was widely understood to have held that First Amendment 
protection should be extended to defamatory falsehoods concerning 
private individuals if the statements involved matters of public con-
cern. The issue of low cost housing involved in the Massachusetts 
anti-snob zoning law could qualify as such a concern. However, in 
June, 1974, the Supreme Court refused to follow this widely-held un-
derstanding of Rosenbloom and perhaps implicitly overruled it in Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, /nc. 124 Gertz held that the New York Times burden of 
proof was applicable only when a public official or a public figure was 
the plaintiff in a libel action against the press or where the plaintiff 
could not show actual damages. 125 Under Gertz, the plaintiff in Dow 
Jones would probably have been required to assume the heavy burden 
of proving "knowledge of . . . falsity or reckless disregard for the 
truth"126 since there is no indication in the record that D'Annolfo 
could show actual damages. 127 
Finally, it should be emphasized that any constitutional newsman 
privilege must be limited when the New York Times burden of proof is 
applicable since to permit a media defendant in a libel action to assert 
such a privilege when the plaintiff is saddled with this heavy burden 
of proof would allow it "to shield itself from the consequences of its 
own wrongdoing."128 Such a result is repugnant to the purposes of 
the First Amendment. Public policy, therefore, demands that such acts 
not be afforded protection under the sanction of the Amendment. 
In summary, had the Supreme Judicial Court recognized a limited 
newsman's privilege and adopted the defendants' three-pronged test, 
the result would probably have been the same-to compel disclosure. 
This conclusion is based on the presumption that the Court would 
have probably required the plaintiff in Dow Jones to meet the onerous 
New York Times burden of proof under the widely-held understanding 
122 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
123 403 u.s. 29 (1971). 
124 418 U.S. at 346. 
125 Id. at 348-49. 
126 ld. at 342. 
127 Since Dow jones was decided before Gertz, however, the distinction between actual 
and presumed damages was not yet so crucial. It is possible, therefore, that D'Annolfo 
could show actual damages if so required in order to prevail on facts not now available 
in the record. 
128 Murasky, supra note 94, at 904. 
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of Rosenbloom. 129 The only difference would have been a postpone-
ment of the forced disclosure, assuming that an independent investi-
gation by the plaintiff would not have revealed the name of the 
source. Had the Court adopted this approach, it is submitted that the 
decision would have accorded the proper respect which is due to the 
defendants' First Amendment rights. 
Finally, it should be noted that the establishment of a qualified 
newsman privilege is still possible in Massachusetts, either through a 
Supreme Court decision recognizing such a privilege in civil litigation 
or through state or federal legislative action. Since it is impossible to 
predict if and when such a Supreme Court opinion might be forth-
coming, it appears that any immediate hope for a newsman privilege 
in Massachusetts rests with the legislature. However, the Supreme 
Judicial Court has noted that the Massachusetts legislature has been 
reluctant to establish such a statutory privilege.130 In view of this, the 
only means of establishing a newsman privilege in Massachusetts in 
the near future may rest with Congress. 131 
RoNNA GREFF ScHNEIDER 
§10.8. The husband's role in the abortion decision: Doe v. 
Doe. 1 In Roe v. Wade 2 and Doe v. Bolton3 the United States Supreme 
Court left unresolved the question of whether any private interests, 
such as those of the father, 4 might limit or curtail a woman's right to 
an abortion.5 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was squarely 
faced with the issue of the husband's rights in the case of Doe v. Doe. 
129 Even if the Court had decided that the New York Times burden of proof was not 
applicable, at least some preliminary inquiry would have been appropriate. 
130 358 Mass. 604, 607 n.5, 266 N.E.2d 297, 299 n.5 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
131 For an examination of the problems of enacting a federal statute which might be 
applicable to the states, see Dixon, Newsmen's Privilege by Federal Legislation: Within 
Congressional Power?, 1 Hastings Const'1 L.Q. 39 (1974). 
§ 10.8. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1089, 314 N.E.2d 128. 
2 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
3 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The extent to which the state could regulate abortions to pre-
serve maternal health was the primary issue in Doe v. Bolton; thus that decision does 
not bear directly on Doe v. Doe. 
4 410 U.S. at 165 n.67, quoted in part in text at note 47 infra. 
5 This note is concerned only with the possible rights of the father. For other recent 
cases in which fathers' rights in the abortion issue were discussed, see Coe v. Gerstein, 
376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 19?3), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 279 (1974) 
(spousal consent provision of Florida abortion statute held unconstitutional); Doe v. 
Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973) (spousal consent 
provision of Utah abortion statute held unconstitutional); Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 
339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974) (injunctive relief de-
nied to a putative father objecting to an abortion). See also Doe v. Bellin Memorial 
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In Doe, petitioner-husband sought declaratory and InJUnctive relief 
against his estranged wife and her physician to prevent the perform-
ance of an abortion. 6 The petitioner and respondent-wife married in 
April 1973. Prior to the marriage, the respondent had a child by 
another man. During the course of the marriage the respondent had 
two pregnancies, one in June 1973 which ended in a miscarriage, and 
another, the subject of this litigation, in November 1973. The couple 
separated in January 1974. In February, the petitioner informed his 
wife that he wished to disavow responsibility for the child and asked 
that his name be omitted from the birth certificate. In response, in a 
reversal of previously expressed convictions, the respondent informed 
the petitioner of her desire to procure an abortion due to her per-
ceived inability to care for two children. 7 
Petitioner objected to the proposed abortion and filed a bill in 
equity on March 5, 1974.8 On March 8, a guardian ad litem was ap-
pointed to represent the interests of the fetus, 9 and in a hearing be-
fore a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, Justice Reardon, 
petitioner testified that he was willing to support the child through his 
own efforts and those of the respondent's sister. 10 The respondent, 
Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 1973) (putative father not an essential party to a suit 
challenging hospital abortion policies). 
Another possible private interest is that of the parent of a minor child who desires an 
abortion. See Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and The Requirement of Parental 
Consent, 60 Va. L. Rev. 305 (1974), Comment, 7 Suffolk L. Rev. 1157 (1973) comment-
ing on the Maryland case In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972), which 
held that a juvenile court had no authority to order a minor to submit to an abortion 
on the motion of the parents. 
In August 1973, the Massachusetts legislature enacted over a gubernatorial veto a 
new abortion statute which contains a parental consent requirement: 
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and not married, the consent of 
both the mother and her parents is required. If one or both of the mother's par-
ents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the 
superior court for good cause shown .... 
Acts of 1974, c. 706, § I. The constitutionality of this provision is currently the sub-
ject of litigation in federal district court. Baird v. Quinn, Civil No. 74-4992-F (D. Mass., 
filed Oct. 30, 1974). 
6 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1090, 314 N.E.2d at 129. 
7 Id. at 1091,314 N.E.2d at 129. 
8 The Supreme Judicial Court and superior courts have original and concurrent 
jurisdiction over suits in equity. G.L. c. 214, § I. The exercise of this concurrent juris-
diction requires a hearing, in the first instance by a single justice of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court. G.L. c. 214, § 8, formerly G.L. c. 214, § 16. 
9 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1090,314 N.E.2d at 129. 
10 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1091, 314 N.E.2d at 129. The question of the husband's 
willingness to support the child was the most significant factual dispute at the hearing 
before the single justice. In the findings of fact by Justice Reardon, it was established 
that the husband wished to see the pregnancy continued and was willing to support the 
child. Findings of Fact at 3, Doe v. Doe, S-7885 (Reardon, J., March 12, 1974). The re-
spondent moved to supplement the findings of fact with the statement of the husband's 
previous attempt to disclaim responsibility for the child. Respondent's Motion to Sup-
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who was in her eighteenth week of pregnancy, did not believe that 
either her husband or her sister was capable of caring for the child 
and declared that if she were prevented from terminating the preg-
nancy she would never consent to giving the petitioner custody of the 
child.U After the hearing, injunctive relief was granted restraining 
both the wife and her physician from proceeding with the abortion, 
and the case was reserved and reported to the full Court.U 
The case was argued on March 13 before the full Supreme Judicial 
Court, which issued an order the next day vacating the injunctive de-
cree and granting the respondent's prayers for declaratory relief. 13 
On July 3, the Court issued a written opinion14 in which it held that 
the husband had no enforceable right to restrain his wife from having 
an abortion. 15 Dissenting in part, Justice Hennessey said that the re-
spondent was under a duty to forbear from procuring the abortion to 
avoid undue interference with the father's familial right, but concur-
red in the vacating of the restraining order due to the difficulties of 
judicial enforcement. 16 In a separate dissent, Justice Reardon declared 
that the father's right in his offspring outweighed the difficulties of 
the wife attendant upon completion of the pregnancy and voted to 
continue the restraining order. 17 
It is submitted that the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Doe v. Doe was correct. This casenote will first trace the development 
of the right of privacy as recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court. Possible bases of a father's right to restrain the mother from 
procuring an abortion and the problems of enforcing such a right will 
then be examined. It will be submitted that while the husband clearly 
has important interests in the abortion decision, they are not of suffi-
cient constitutional magnitude to warrant protection in contravention 
of the woman's right to privacy. It will be further submitted that the 
difficulty of formulating an adequate remedy virtually forecloses the 
possibility of legislative response to the decision in . the form of an 
plement, Doe v. Doe, S-7885 (March 12, I974). Apparently the Court did not feel that 
resolution of this factual issue was critical to its decision and merely acknowledged both 
versions without giving greater weight to eiilier one. I974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at I09I, 3I4 
N.E.2d at I29. 
11 I974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at I09I, 3I4 N.E.2d at I29. 
12 ld. At the hearing it was also established that the wife was in the eighteenth week 
of pregnancy, that the fetus was not viable, that the wife's general health was good, and 
that there was minimal risk in carrying the pregnancy to full term or in the perform-
ance of a saline abortion as long as that procedure was performed prior to ilie twenty-
eighth week of pregnancy. ld., 3I4 N.E.2d at I30. 
13 I974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at I090, 3I4 N.E.2d at I29. 
14 ld. at 1089-90, 3I4 N.E.2d at 128-29. The opinion presumes that the abortion was 
performed promptly after the March decision. Id. 
15 Id. at I096, 3I4 N.E.2d at I32. 
16 Id. at I097-IIOO, 3I4 N.E.2d at I33-34 (Hennessey,]., dissenting in part). 
17 ld. at II 00-08, 3I4 N .E.2d at I34-39 (Reardon, J., dissenting). 
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abortion statute with a spousal consent requirement. 
I. THE MoTHER'S RIGHT oF PRIVACY AND THE ABoRTION DECISION 
Although there is no specific mention of a right of privacy in the 
United States Constitution, such a right was given implicit recognition 
as early as the nineteenth century. 18 In recent years various justices of 
the Supreme Court have derived such a right from the "penumbras" 
surrounding the guarantees in the Bill of Rights; 19 from the Ninth 
Amendment; 20 and from the Fourteenth Amendment. 21 The right of 
privacy has been invoked to protect activities such as the choice of a 
marriage partner, 22 procreation, 23 contraception, 24 and abortion25 
against improper state interference. 
The privacy doctrine has been developed most extensively in defin-
ing the limits of permissible governmental interference with decisions 
affecting the marital relationship. 26 Indeed, Griswold v. Connecticut,21 
the landmark case recognized as expressly establishing the right of 
18 This early recognition of the right of privacy can be traced back to Union Pac. Ry. 
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), which held that a court could not order a plaintiff in 
a personal i~ury suit to submit to a physical examination. Id. at 257. The Court stated: 
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than 
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from 
all restraint or interference, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Id. at 
251. See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (wiretapping not a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
19 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where Justice Douglas, writing 
for the majority, noted that prior decisions of the Court suggested that "specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those 
guarantees that help give them life and substance." Id. at 484. 
20 See id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). "The enumeration in the Constitution of 
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple." U.S. Const. amend. IX. 
21 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (Biackmun,J., for the majority). In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Stewart found the right of privacy implicit in the concept of 
"liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment. I d. at 169. 
22 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (anti-miscegenation statute unconstitutional). 
23 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute under which a person convicted 
of two or more specified felonies could be sterilized was unconstitutional). "We are deal-
ing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage 
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 
541. But see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (statute upheld permitting sterilization 
of mental patients after court hearing to facilitate release from state institution). 
24 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965). 
25 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
26 E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In a non-marital context, the right 
of privacy was held to protect the possession of obscene films in one's own home. Stan-
ley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
2 7 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
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privacy,28 involved this very issue; the Court cited as authority in sup-
port of its holding cases involving unreasonable state interference in 
family affairs. 29 In Griswold, a Connecticut statute forbidding the use 
of contraceptives and an aiding and abetting statute providing crimi-
nal sanctions for physicians who counseled married couples in their 
use were held unconstitutional as an invasion of the right of marital 
privacy. 30 
Following Griswold, the Supreme Court recognized in Eisenstadt v. 
Baird31 that the right of privacy protected certain activities of the indi-
vidual as well as those affecting the marital relationship. 32 Eisenstadt 
reversed the conviction of a birth control advocate under a Mas-
sachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives for 
birth control purposes by anyone except physicians or pharmacists33 
28 See Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and 
Things Forgotte_n: The Griswold Case, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 235 (1965). 
29 381 U.S. at 481. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court invalidated 
a Nebraska statute forbidding the teaching of foreign languages below the ninth grade, 
holding that it infringed the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 
402. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court struck down an 
Oregon statute requiring parents or guardians to send children between the ages of 
eight and sixteen to a public school, holding that it unreasonably interfered with the 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of their chil-
dren. Id. at 534-35. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), upholding as an 
exercise of the freedom of religion the right of Amish parents to withhold their chil-
dren from public secondary schools. Id. at 214-15. 
30 381 U.S. at 486. 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights .... Marriage is a 
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring and intimate to the 
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; 
a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social 
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior 
decisions. 
Id. The statute invalidated was Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 53-32 (1958), repealed, P.A. 
828, § 214 ( 1969). This was the third time the contraception statute was challenged. In 
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943), the Supreme Court dismissed the case on the 
ground that the plaintiff physician lacked standing to challenge the statute on behalf of 
his patients. In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), the case was dismissed for lack of 
ripeness since the plaintiffs had not been charged with violating the statute and virtu-
ally no one had been prosecuted under it since its enactment in 1879. In Griswold, 
appellants had standing to challenge the statute due to their criminal conviction under 
an aiding and abetting statute as accessories. 381 U.S. at 481. 
31 405 u.s. 438 (1972). 
32 The Court in Eisenstadt noted explicitly that in Griswold "the right of privacy in 
question inhered in the marital relationship." Id. at 453. 
33 Id. at 441-42. The statute which the Court declared unconstitutional was G.L. c. 
272, § 21 which read in part: 
Except as provided in section twenty-one A, whoever sells, lends or gives away ... 
any drug, medicine, instrument, or article whatever for the prevention of concep-
tion . . . shall be punished in the state prison for not more than five years or in 
jail or the house of correction for not more than two and one half years or by a 
fine of not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars. 
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and a companion statute limiting the availability of such contracep-
tives to married couples.34 The Court held that a classification based 
on marital status for the purposes of regulating the distribution of 
contraceptives was unconstitutional. 35 This holding was based on the 
idea that the right of privacy is an individual right, although the ac-
tivities protected often affect the marital relationship, and that ulti-
mately the marital "unit" was "but an association of two individuals, 
each with a separate intellectual and emotional make-up."36 The indi-
vidual, not just the marital unit, is protected from unwarranted state 
interference by the right of privacy. 
The major cases involving the right of privacy,37 particularly 
Griswold and Eisenstadt, provided the constitutional background for the 
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. 38 Roe held the Texas crimi-
nal abortion statute, which proscribed all abortions except where 
necessary to save the life of the mother,39 unconstitutional as an inva-
sion of the woman's right of privacy.40 This right was held to be 
"broad enough to encompass the woman's decision whether or not to 
terminate a pregnancy."41 The right to decide to have an abortion 
could only be limited when the state was acting to protect certain in-
terests which become compelling at different points during the period 
The Court held that the statute did not even rationally relate to the twin goals of the 
statute as interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court: (1) to protect the health of the 
Commonwealth and (2) to protect the public morality by serving to deter fornication. 
405 U.S. at 447-53. 
34 405 U.S. at 441. The statute was G.L. c. 272, § 21A, which read in part: "A regis-
tered physician may administer to or prescribe for any married person drugs or articles 
intended for the prevention of pregnancy or contraception .... " 
35 405 U.S. at 453. The Court's description of the family in Eisenstadt, in which the 
individuality of the family members was emphasized, should be compared to the 
Griswold conception of the family as an entity: 
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its 
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and 
emotional make-up. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting the person as the decision whether to bear 
or beget a child. 
Id. See note 30 supra. 
36 405 U.S. at 453. 
3 7 See text at notes 18-36 supra. 
38 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a discussion of Roe v. Wade, see Ely, The Wages of Cry-
ing Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973); Heymann & Barzelay, 
The Forest and The Ttees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U .L. Rev. 765 (1973); 
Note, Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation and Legisla-
tion, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 239 (1974). 
39 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 4512.1-.6 (Supp. 1974), formerly Tex. Penal Code arts. 
1191-96 (1948). 
40 410 U.S. at 153. 
41 Id. 
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of gestation. 42 The state's interest in protecting maternal health does 
not become compelling until the end of the first trimester when the 
risk of an abortion is commensurate with or greater than the risks of 
a full term pregnancy. Until that point, the abortion decision is a mat-
ter for a woman and her physician.43 The state's interest in protecting 
potential life becomes compelling only at the point of fetal viability, 
the end of the second trimester.44 At that point, the state may totally 
proscribe abortions except where necessary to protect maternal 
health. 45 
The major cases dealing with the right of privacy46 have addressed 
only the permissible limits of state interference with the exercise of 
this right. The decision in Roe v. Wade left unresolved the question of 
whether there exist any private interests which might warrant constitu-
tional protection so as to limit or curtail the woman's right to have an 
abortion. However, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the pos-
sible existence of such private interests in a footnote to its decision in 
Roe: 
Neither in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton ... do we discuss 
the father's rights, if any exist in the constitutional context, in the abor-
tion decision. No paternal right has been asserted in either of the 
cases, and the Texas and Georgia statutes on their face take no 
cognizance of the father ... _47 
II. THE FATHER AND THE ABORTION DECISION 
The petitioner-husband in Doe v. Doe claimed to have "a fundamen-
tal right, guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, to de-
termine that his child shall not be aborted,"48 and cited Mr. Justice 
Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut as authority.49 
42 Id. at 155. "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held 
that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' 
... and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legiti-
mate state interests at stake." Id. (citations omitted). See Note, 30 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
628 (1973). 
43 410 U.S. at 163. In the respondent's brief in Doe v. Doe, it was noted that the 
mother's physician had testified before Justice Reardon that in the United States the 
death rate for saline-type abortions is two deaths out of 40,000 procedures, while the 
death rate of mothers in childbirth is twenty-one out of 100,000: Brief for Respondent 
at 7-8, Doe v. Doe, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1089,314 N.E.2d 128. 
44 410 U.S. at 163-64. 
45 Id. 
46 See text at notes 18-36 supra. 
47 410 U.S. at 165 n.67 (emphasis added). 
48 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1092, 314 N.E.2d at 130. 
49 ld. "And, the Ninth Amendment, in indicating that not all such liberties are specif-
ically mentioned in the first eight amendments, is surely relevant in showing the exis-
tence of other fundamental personal rights, now protected from state, as well as federal 
infringement." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (concurring opinion). 
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The Supreme Judicial Court rejected this claim as having "no basis."50 
It is submitted that while the Court ultimately resolved this question 
correctly, it acted too summarily in rejecting petitioner's claim without 
carefully examining its possible constitutional basis. 51 
Since a woman's constitutionally protected right of privacy, which 
encompasses the right to decide to have an abortion, was deemed 
"fundamental" in character in Roe v. Wade, 52 presumably a right 
which a father could successfully assert to limit or curtail the mother's 
right to an abortion must also be fundamental. 53 A balance would 
then have to be drawn between these conflicting interests, and a court 
would have to determine under what conditions and at what stage in 
the .pregnancy a father could enjoin an abortion. 
One possible right of sufficient magnitude which a father might as-
sert to balance out the woman's fundamental right to an abortion is 
the right to procreate. Procreation was found to be a constitutionally 
protected fundamental right in Skinner v. Oklahoma,54 in which an Ok-
lahoma statute providing for sterilization of certain classes of con-
victed felons was declared unconstitutional. 55 The Supreme Court de-
scribed procreation as "one of the basic civil rights of man."56 Clearly, 
the mother's decision to terminate a pregnancy frustrates the father's 
natural expectation of procreation. It could be argued that the fun-
damental right recognized in Skinner encompasses the expectancy of 
procreation as well as the capacity to procreate. Thus, if procreation is 
50 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1093, 314 N.E.2d at 130. The Court likewise found no 
basis for such a right in either Massachusetts statutes or common law. Id. at 1093-95, 
314 N.E.2d at 130-32. However, even if the Court had found a statutory or common 
law right of the husband to prevent an abortion, such a right could not prevail over the 
wife's fundamental Constitutional right of privacy. 
51 Prior to reaching the merits, the Court held that maintenance of the action was not 
barred by the Massachusetts interspousal immunity statute, G.L. c. 209, § 6 (Supp. 
1974), because interspousal immunity does not bar maintenance of an action where 
there is a recognized ground of equity jurisdiction. 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1091-92, 314 
N.E.2d at 130, citing Charney v. Charney, 315 Mass. 580, 55 N.E.2d 917 (1944). 
52 410 U.S. at 153. For cases involving other personal interests that the Supreme 
Court has found to be "fundamental," see Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 
621 (1969) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968) (travel); Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (education); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) 
(procreation). 
53 In Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973), appeal dismissed, cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 279 (1974), in which a three judge federal district court held the spousal 
consent provision of the Florida abortion statute unconstitutional, the court suggested 
that if the state could demonstrate that the statute protected third party interests out-
side the categories of maternal health and potential life, the statute could withstand 
constitutional attack. 376 F. Supp. at 697. However, the court in Coe did not describe 
such possible interests nor did it address the question of how substantial these interests 
would have to be. 
54 316 u.s. 535 (1942). 
55 Id. at 536-37. 
56 Id. at 541. 
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considered a fundamental right in the abortion context, then it is ar-
guable that the frustration of the expectancy, as opposed to the capac-
ity to procreate, provides the father with a sufficient constitutional 
basis to require judicial balancing of the respective fundamental rights 
of father and mother. However, although abortion may frustrate the 
expectant interest in procreation, it does not destroy it, as sterilization 
would. Thus, it is submitted that the Skinner rationale does not apply. 
Since the right to procreate is not being permanently denied when an 
abortion is performed, the father's interest may therefore be less than 
"fundamental," in which case his interest should not infringe upon 
the woman's right to decide to have an abortion. 
A second possible basis for a constitutional right of a father to pre-
vent an abortion is the expectant father-child relationship.57 It is 
necessary first to determine whether the father's interest in the rela-
tionship could be characterized as fundamental. In Griswold, Justice 
Goldberg posited that the existence of a fundamental right is deter-
mined by examining the tradition and conscience of a society and as-
certaining whether a given principle was so rooted there as to be 
fundamental. 58 He found that the family relationship was of such a 
character.59 However, although the expectant nature of the father-
child relationship has been recognized in the common law, the nature 
of the expectancy was defined primarily in economic terms. 6° For ex-
ample, as was noted by Justice Reardon in his dissent in Doe v. Doe, 
the father's expectant interest in the unborn child has been recog-
nized in the common law relating to class gifts and tort recovery for 
57 H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, § 2.17, at Ill (1966). Such a right would 
clearly be dependent on the right to procreate, but would differ from it by focusing on 
such factors as the emotional satisfaction derived from the developing relationship be-
tween father and child rather than on a desire in -the abstract to see one's bloodline 
continued. See Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relation, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 
177, 181 (1916). 
58 381 U.S. at 493 (concurring opinion). 
59 Id. at 496. 
60 The common law imposed a duty on the father to support his legitimate children 
during their minority. Angel v. McLellan, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 27, 29 (1819). This aspect 
of the common law was so universal that in Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340 (1905), the 
Supreme Court was able to say that the support obligation existed in all states. Id. at 
351. In Massachusetts the obligation is also imposed by statute. G.L. c. 273, § l. In con-
sideration of this duty the father was deemed entitled to the wages, custody, society, 
and services of the child. Benson v. Remington, 2 Mass. (2 Tyng) 113 (1806). If the 
child left the father's home or stayed away without just cause, the duty to support 
ended, absent any statute or court decree to the contrary. Angel v. McLellan, 16 Mass. 
(16 Tyng) 27, 30 (1819). If onl¥ the economic interest were involved in the abortion de-
cision, the mother's interest in the exercise of her constitutionally protected personal 
rights would seem to be superior to the husband's interest in protecting his property 
right. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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pre-natal injury. 61 The general rule in tort and property law is to rec-
ognize a child as in being from the time of conception when such rec-
ognition serves the beneficial interest of the child.62 However, the in-
terests are contingent and normally do not attach until the live birth 
of the child. 63 
The difficulty with resolving the issue of paternal rights raised in 
Doe v. Doe by analogy to concepts of tort and property law is that the 
legal principles underlying both areas of the law operate to achieve 
different purposes and protect different interests than are involved in 
the abortion decision. While the law may recognize the unborn as 
within the scope of a class gift, 64 this is not as much a symbolic recog-
nition of the fact that parental interests arise during the period of 
gestation as it is a rule of construction that attempts to give effect to 
the intent of the testator and promote the settling of estates. 65 Simi-
larly, the allowance of tort recovery for pre-natal injury is an attempt 
to punish the wrongdoer and compensate the child-victim for the in-
jury sustained.66 Thus, in the case of abortion, where, as a conse-
quence of Roe v. Wade, there is no legally recognized third-party 
wrongdoer or victim, the common law of torts and property are 
i?appropriate sources of a paternal right to nullify the mother's deci-
sion. 
It has been suggested by commentators67 and by Justice Reardon in 
his dissent in Doe68 that the father's expectant relational interest in the 
child was given constitutional protection by the Supreme Court in 
Stanley v. Illinois. 69 The Court there held that an Illinois statute mak-
81 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at ll03-06, 314 N.E.2d at 136-38 (Reardon,J., dissenting), cit-
ing Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967); Keyes v. 
Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Hall v. Hancock, 32 
Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834). See notes 64, 66 infra: 
82 Note, 46 Notre Dame Law. 349,354 (1971). 
83 Note, I Hastings Const'l L.Q. 251, 261-62 (1974). 
84 See Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834) (a child en ventre sa mere was 
within the scope of a class gift to grandchildren living at testator's death). 
85 But see 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at ll05-06, 314 N.E.2d at 137-38 (Reardon, J., dis-
senting). 
88 See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §§ 1-2, 55, at 1-14, 335-38 (4th ed. 
1971). In Massachusetts the law allows recovery for pre-natal injuries sustained prior to 
viability as long as the issue is born alive. Leccese v. McDonough, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
191, 279 N.E.2d 339. Compare Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 
(1884) (no recovery for pre-natal injury) with Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 
Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967) (recovery allowed for pre-natal injury sustained be-
fore viability if the child is born alive) and Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 
633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960) (recovery allowed for pre-natal injury sustained after viabil-
ity providing the child is born alive). 
87 See, e.g., Comment, 6 St. Mary's L.J. 407, 415 (1974); Note, 7 Fam. L.Q. 413, 424 
(1973). 
88 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at ll04-05, 314 N.E.2d at 137 (dissenting opinion). 
89 405 u.s. 645 (1972). 
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ing children of an unwed father wards of the state upon the death of 
the natural mother was unconstitutional since the unwed father, un-
like married fathers and unwed mothers, was not allowed a hearing at 
which to establish his fitness to retain custody of the child. 70 The 
Court wrote that "the private interest here, that of a man in the chil-
dren he has sired and raised undeniably warrants deference, and absent 
a powerful countervailing interest, protection."71 
The language in Stanley suggests the existence of a constitutionally 
protected relational right vested in the father. However, the use of 
the term "sired and raised" may suggest that the expectancy produced 
merely by the siring of the child is not sufficient to warrant protec-
tion. Furthermore, the father's right recognized in Stanley was not an 
absolute right to the custody of his children, but a right to a hearing 
in which he might establish his fitness for custody. 72 Thus, it is sub-
mitted that the father's rights recognized in Stanley are not directly 
applicable to the abortion situation. 
It is clear that the abortion will terminate the father's expectant in-
terest in the particular fetus which is aborted. However, the presence 
of other children or the possibility of future births from which the 
father might derive benefits of the paternal expectancy may mitigate 
the effect of a particular deprivation. The abortion may thus only 
postpone or merely lessen the expected benefits of the father-child re-
lationship. The impact of the abortion is substantially less under these 
circumstances than if the possibility of such a relationship were totally 
and permanently foreclosed. It would seem that, as in the case of the 
procreation expectancy, such mitigating circumstances would diminish 
the relative weight of the interests which the father could assert and, 
as a result, the woman's rights would prevail. 
III. THE REMEDY PROBLEM 
If a father were found to have a fundamental right to procreate 
and/or raise his children that might outweigh the mother's right to 
privacy, the problems facing courts attempting to balance these rights 
on a case-by-case basis73 and to fashion appropriate remedies would 
70 Id. at 646. 
71 Id. at 651 (emphasis added). 
72 Id. at 657-58. 
73 Even though the dissenting justices in Doe v. Doe recognized the existence of a 
right in the husband, both proceeded to analyze the facts of the case and concluded 
that in the situation before them the right in the father was worthy of recognition. This 
was based on the long-term loss which the husband would suffer as opposed to the 
short-term inconvenience which the woman would have to bear. 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1099, 314 N.E.2d at 134 (Hennessey, J., dissenting in part); id. at II06-08, 314 N.E.2d 
at 138-39 (Reardon, J., dissenting}. 
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be formidable. In situations where the father prevails, the result 
might be the birth of a child unwanted by the mother. Situations 
might arise where the husband has abandoned the family for a period 
of time and returned for the purpose of stopping the abortion or has 
withheld consent out of malice. In such situations it would seem clear 
that the equities are against granting relief to the husband. Other cir-
cumstances, such as the inability of the husband or wife to have 
further children, may tip the balance in the other direction. 
The need to resort to a case-by-case approach would greatly reduce 
the certainty which the Supreme Judicial Court was trying to 
achieve. 74 Doctors and hospitals would still face the uncertainties that 
preceded Doe v. Doe and would be unable to balance the equities with-
out resort to the judicial process. In addition, as the majority in Doe 
noted, the law generally does not seek to resolve questions concerning 
the marital relationship except in cases of divorce or separation. 75 
Thus, the use of a case-by-case approach, calling upon the courts to 
play the role of marriage counselors, may be beyond the bounds of 
general principles of equity jurisprudence. 76 
The effect of a decision favoring the husband would be to subject 
the "exercise of the individual right of privacy of the mother in all 
abortions at all stages of pregnancy, to the consent of others."77 Of 
course, if the father's rights are less than fundamental, they would be 
inadequate to limit or curtail the woman's right to decide to have an 
abortion. Were the father's rights found to be "fundamental" and 
held to prevail, such a decision would amount to a virtual judicial nul-
lification of the decision in Roe v. Wade in instances of spousal dis-
harmony and render the woman's right meaningless. 78 
74 "The practical impact of the existing legal uncertainties on doctors and hospitals is 
such that clarification is in the public interest .... " Id. at 1092, 314 N.E.2d at 130. 
75 Id. at 1096-97, 314 N.E.2d at 132. 
76 In Kenyon v. Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946), wherein it was held 
that a court of equity could act to protect personal rights as well as property rights, it 
was stated in dictum that there are "personal rights of such delicate and intimate 
character that direct enforcement of them by any process of the court should never be 
attempted." Id. at 534, 70 N.E.2d at 245. The Court in Doe questioned whether this was 
such a case, but was able to avoid answering the question by anticipating its decision on 
the merits and merely stated that equitable considerations were not controlling with re-
spect to declaratory relief. 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1092, 314 N.E.2d at 130. However, if 
a right in the father were established, this question would then have to be answered. 
77 Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 193 (D. Utah), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973). 
78 One of the considerations which the Court took into account in its decision was the 
possibility that a decision favoring the husband would force women to resort to illegal 
abortionists. 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1096, 314 N.E.2d at 132. See People v. Belous, 71 
Cal. 2d 954,458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), where in holding California's abor-
tion statute unconstitutional, it was noted that illegal abortions were the most common 
single cause of maternal deaths in California. Id. at 965, 458 P.2d at 201, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
at 361. 
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If the father is found to have an enforceable right in the abortion 
decision, situations could arise where the mother is likely to ignore the 
injunction or actually obtains an abortion in violation of a court order. 
Extremely difficult problems arise in fashioning effective remedies 
consistent with current principles of equity jurisprudence. Some of 
the possible means of enforcing the father's right are: (1) criminal 
sanctions for the operating physician; 79 (2) the imposition of civil lia-
bility on physicians who fail to obtain the father's consent;80 (3) the 
use of the contempt remedy to incarcerate the woman to prevent her 
from procuring an abortion; 81 and (4) incarcerating the woman if she 
obtains an abortion in violation of an injunction through the criminal 
contempt remedy. 82 However, as discussed below, none of these pos-
sible remedies is consistent with current constitutional law or equity 
jurisprudence. 
The use of criminal sanctions against the physician seems to be 
foreclosed by Roe v. Wade. Roe implies that the abortion decision may 
not be regulated through the criminal law except where such sanc-
tions would further the state's interests in protecting maternal health 
after the first trimester, or protecting potential life after fetal 
viability.83 A state statute enforcing a spousal consent provision 
through the use of criminal sanctions could be interpreted as an at-
tempt to regulate the abortion decision in a manner inconsistent with 
the holding of Roe v. Wade under the guise of protecting private in-
terests. A statutory or common law tort84 which substituted the possi-
bility of civil liability for criminal sanctions could suffer from the same 
defect. A state is foreclosed from imposing civil liability for those "of-
fenses" which it is powerless to punish under the criminal law since 
the existence of the sanctions in and of themselves would have an in-
hibitory effect on the exercise of fundamental rights. 85 
79 E.g., Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-5-616 (Supp. 1974). 
80 E.g., Idaho Code § 18-609 (Supp. 1973). 
81 For a discussion of the civil contempt remedy, see Z. Chafee, Some Problems of 
Equity 296-380 ( 1950). 
82 See Godard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 319 Mass. 345, 347, 65 N.E.2d 555, 557 
( 1946). 
83 410 U.S. at 162-65 (by implication). 
84 See Herko v. Uviller, 203 Misc. 108, 114 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct. 1952), where a 
husband sued a doctor for performing an abortion on his wife for deprivation of 
offspring and loss of consortium. The wife's consent to the abortion was held to bar re-
covery. Id. at 109, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 619. But see Note, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (1962), 
commenting on the case of Touriel v. Benveniste, Civil No. 766790 (L.A., Calif. Super. 
Ct., Oct. 21, 1961) wherein a trial court allowed a husband to recover on similar facts. 
The court in that case held that the husband had legally protectible interests in the un-
born child which were separate from his wife's and thus her consent did not bar his re-
covery. 14 Stan. L. Rev. at 901-04. 
85 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964). In this case the Court 
declared that a large damage award in a libel suit would be as repugnant to the First 
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The use of either the civil or criminal contempt remedy to enforce 
an injunction or to penalize the violation of a court order gives rise to 
different problems. As noted by Justice Hennessey in his dissent in 
Doe, the only way to insure the woman's effective compliance with a 
court order would be to incarcerate her until such time as an abortion 
was no longer practical.86 This was a prospect which Justice Hennes-
sey found "unthinkable" since the woman was not held criminally re-
sponsible even under the old, now invalid, abortion statute.87 Finally, 
should the woman procure an abortion in spite of an injunction, a 
court could seek to vindicate the validity of its enforcement powers88 
by incarcerating the woman or imposing a fine as punishment for the 
affront to the dignity of the court. This prospect would present a 
situation whereby a woman would be more vulnerable to court sanc-
tions after Roe v. Wade than before, and thus it is highly questionable 
whether a court would impose such a penalty. 
It appears that the only legal remedy available to a husband in this 
situation is the post facto remedy of divorce. A legislature could then 
deal with the woman's non-compliance with the wishes of the husband 
by declaring that procuring an abortion without spousal consent 
would be grounds for divorce. Beyond that, the decision in Doe seems 
to have foreclosed the possibility of legislative response, both in terms 
of declaring a right or prescribing an appropriate and constitutionally 
permissible remedy. The situation would be different in the third 
trimester when the state, acting pursuant to the authority recognized 
in Roe v. Wade, can proscribe abortions completely except where 
necessary to protect maternal health.89 At this point the state might be 
able to impose a requirement of spousal consent. This does not sug-
gest that the state has greater rights than the father. It merely recog-
nizes that subsequent to viability, the interest of the state and the pri-
vate interest of the father would coincide and the state could simul-
taneously vindicate its own interest while protecting that of the father. 
CoNCLUSioN 
After Doe v. Doe it appears that there can be no recognition of a 
father's right in the abortion decision in Massachusetts unless the 
Amendment as would criminal sanction. Id. at 277-78. The notion that laws must not 
inhibit the exercise of personal rights is applicable to the right of privacy as well as 
those rights specifically protected under the First Amendment. 
88 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1099-1100, 314 N.E.2d at 134 (Hennessey, J., dissenting in 
part). 
87 Id. See Commonwealth v. Follansbee, 155 Mass. 274, 29 N.E. 471 (1892) (person 
on whom an abortion was performed not liable as an accomplice). 
88 See Godard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 319 Mass. 345, 347, 65 N.E.2d 555, 557 
(1946). 
89 410 U.S. at 163-64. 
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United States Supreme Court eventually answers the question it left 
open in Roe v. Wade in favor of the father. Although the state legisla-
ture could theoretically enact a law creating such rights, the law would 
no doubt be unconstitutional if applied in contravention of the 
woman's exercise of her right of privacy. If, however, the Supreme 
Court were to recognize a right in the father, the difficulty of provid-
ing a remedy to enforce that right consistent with current principles 
of equity jurisprudence would make the recognition of that right of 
little value. 
MARC D. GREENBAUM 
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